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REGULATION AND THE MARGINALIST REVOLUTION
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Abstract
The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for 
the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” economy. For the classical 
political economists, value was a function of past averages. Marginalism 
substituted forward looking theories based on expectations about firm 
and market performance. Marginalism swept through university 
economics, and by 1920 or so virtually every academic economist was a 
marginalist.
This Article considers the historical influence of marginalism on 
regulatory policy in the United States. My view is at odds with those who 
argue that marginalism saved capitalism by rationalizing it as a more 
defensible buttress against incipient socialism. While marginalism did 
permit economists and policy makers to strike a middle ground between 
laissez faire and socialism, the “middle ground” tilted very strongly 
toward public control. Ironically, regulation plus private ownership was 
able to go much further in the United States than socialism ever could 
because it preserved the rhetoric of capital as privately owned, even as it 
deprived firms of many of the most important indicia of ownership.
Marginalism upended many of the classical conceptions about the 
market, including assumptions about their robustness, as well as the need 
for government intervention and the optimal type. For regulatory policy 
the most important issues were: (1) The fixed-cost controversy and the 
scope of natural monopoly; (2) cost classification, incentives, and 
ratemaking; (3) the changing domain of market failure, and regulation 
and Pigouvian taxes as correctives; (4) market diversity and the rise of 
sector regulation; (5) deregulation; (6) concerns about the distribution of 
wealth; (7) the development of cost-benefit analysis; and (8) the 
assessment of risk. The final section examines risk management under 
marginalism by looking at two diverse but important areas: negligence 
and products liability in tort law, and administrative review of patents by 
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.
                                                                                                                     
* James G. Dinan University Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law and 
The Wharton School. Thanks to audiences at the conference on New Perspectives on U.S. 
Regulatory History, Harvard Business School; and a faculty seminar, Northwestern University 
Law School.
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INTRODUCTION: CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND REGULATION
The neoclassical, or marginalist, revolution in economics had a
profound and lasting impact on the theory and policy of regulation. It
became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” 
economy. Marginalism, which best identifies the dividing line between 
classical political economy and neoclassical economics, originated 
during the 1860s and 1870s in the work of William Stanley Jevons in 
England, Carl Menger in Austria, Leon Walras in Switzerland, and a little 
later John Bates Clark in the United States.1 The classical political 
                                                                                                                     
1. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 294–325 (4th ed. 1985); 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970,
at 27–32 (2015) (expanding on marginalism). See generally JOHN BATES CLARK, THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF WAGES, INTERESTS AND PROFITS (1899) (emphasizing 
natural law); WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871) (analyzing 
political economy as a science); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (James Dingwall &
Bert F. Hoselitz trans., Ludwig von Mises Institute 2007) (1871) (advocating value based on 
marginal utility and risk rather than labor); LÉON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS
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economists, including Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill 
in his earlier years,2 had believed that value was determined mainly by 
the amount of socially necessary labor that went into something in the 
past. A capital investment reflected value because the production of 
capital required labor.
In sharp contrast, marginalists developed a subjective and behavioral 
conception that value is a function of marginal willingness to pay—that 
is, how much would someone pay to obtain or avoid a certain good or 
other outcome? The marginal value of any good decreased as one had 
more of it and, at the margin, people maximize value by equating 
marginal utilities. This observation enabled marginalists to develop 
highly useful theories about the optimal mixture of any person’s goods 
and services. Computing these values, however, called for increasing use 
of mathematics at a scale that was unfamiliar to most classical political 
economists.
While classical conceptions of value were objective and backward 
looking, marginalism was both forward looking and based on subjective 
valuation, although in many cases the relevant value was that of a 
presumed “rational” actor.3 The move toward valuation based on 
preference also brought interest group theory into economic analysis in a 
way that it had never existed before. Depending on their characteristics, 
different interest groups value outcomes in different ways. The search for 
a “social” value required that these differences be accounted for in some 
meaningful way.
When coupled with the concept of declining marginal utility, 
marginalism facilitated greatly increased use of mathematics to explain 
how markets work. Formulating marginalism into what became modern 
price theory and industrial organization became the task of a second 
generation of marginalists—beginning with Alfred Marshall of 
Cambridge, whose Principles of Economics was published in 1890 and 
went through numerous editions.4
Marginalism completely upended classical political economy’s theory 
of value, which had largely been drawn from averages of past experience.
For example, under classicism the optimal rate of wages was dictated by 
the wage-fund doctrine, which held that the fund available for the 
                                                                                                                     
(William Jaffe trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1977) (1874) (establishing Walras’s theory 
of general equilibrium).
2. On Mill’s late career rejection of the wage-fund doctrine, see generally Arthur C. Pigou, 
Mill and the Wages Fund, 59 ECON. J. 171 (1949).
3. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV.
305, 316 (1993).
4. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890) (introducing 
marginalist price theory).
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payment of wages was determined by the amount of capital retained from 
previous production. This then had to be divided among the number of 
workers.5 If a firm’s wages exceeded this amount, it would end up 
borrowing against the future, which was a road to insolvency. An
analytically similar classical doctrine was the theory of corporate finance:
that the value of a corporation equaled the amount of capital that had been 
paid into it.6 The marginalist critique of these doctrines observed that they 
had little to do with actual market behavior. The wage that an employer 
is willing to pay is not based on the amount in some historical fund, but 
on the employer’s expectations about how much value the employee will 
contribute to the firm.7 Equally, the value of a corporation is not a 
function of the amount of capital that has been paid in, but rather the 
firm’s prospects for the future. As one early twentieth century treatise on 
corporate finance observed concerning the change, “there is very seldom 
even a close correspondence between the original investment of capital 
and the value of a corporation’s assets.”8
In the United States the dispute over marginalism led to an upheaval 
in the American Economic Association, which had been founded in 
1885.9 The neoclassicists won out and marginalist approaches swept the 
field. Today every mainstream economist is some kind of marginalist.
Marginalism’s most disquieting feature was its threat to the traditional 
dividing line between private property and public control. Private 
ownership had generally assumed private control, limited mainly by the 
common law of nuisance and regulations that fell within a triumvirate of 
exceptions to the Gilded Age Supreme Court’s anti-regulatory bias—
namely, health, safety, and morals.10 Beginning in the late nineteenth 
century the Supreme Court began permitting some rate regulation of 
railroads, public utilities, or other bottleneck industries.11
By contrast, marginalism’s critique of the laissez faire state cut very 
broadly, undermining much of classical political economy. My own 
                                                                                                                     
5. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 193–98 (1991).
6. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 159–71 (discussing the revolution in 
corporate finance).
7. E.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at 397 (developing marginal productivity theory of wages).
8. WILLIAM H. LOUGH & FREDERICK W. FIELD, CORPORATION FINANCE: AN EXPOSITION OF 
THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS GOVERNING THE PROMOTION, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 
OF MODERN CORPORATIONS 125 (8th ed. 1916) (1909); see also id. at 127–28, 130–31 (discussing 
the correspondence between original investment and value of assets).
9. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 75–76.
10. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 243–62 for a discussion of nineteenth century 
regulation of health, safety, and morals. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW 
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 191–233 (1996) (discussing pre-Gilded 
Age regulation).
11. See discussion infra notes 104–12.
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views of marginalism in the United States are somewhat at odds with 
those expressed by historians such as Dorothy Ross. She presented 
marginalism as capitalism’s savior to the extent that it created a new, 
more defensible paradigm that “offered Americans assurance that the 
new industrial world could still operate like the old.”12 To be sure, 
marginalism permitted economists to strike a middle ground between 
laissez faire and socialism, but the “middle ground” was in fact very far 
removed from the antistatist vision of the classical political economists.
Regulation under marginalist principles did not lead to a large increase 
in public business ownership, as socialism threatened. To a significant 
extent, however, it deprived private firms of the power to make their own 
economic decisions about market entry, price, and other central features 
of private property. Regulation became public ownership in disguise. 
Every element of private firm behavior within an agency’s jurisdiction 
became subject to government review under a public interest standard.
Ironically, regulation plus private ownership was able to go much 
further in the United States than socialism ever could because it preserved 
the rhetoric of capital as privately owned—but all the while depriving 
private firms of the traditional indicia of ownership. Ronald Coase gave 
us the idea that anything that can be specified by a firm can also be 
specified as a set of contracts.13 Similarly, regulation under marginalist 
tools developed the idea that public regulators could specify for the firm 
nearly anything that the firm could specify for itself.
Socialism and public ownership never came close to being a dominant 
model for management of the economy in the United States, even for the 
Progressives.14 Socialist political parties never attained anything like the 
representation they were able to achieve in many European countries.15
But regulation could preserve the image of private ownership while
completely undermining its most central indicia. The real key to
                                                                                                                     
12. DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 179 (1991).
13. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 391 (1937); see also
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
3–4 (1975) (discussing Coase’s article); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 
(1976) (discussing Coase in relation to the firm). 
14. See generally Eric Foner, Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?, 17 HIST.
WORKSHOP J. 57 (1984) (discussing the failures of socialism). The title was borrowed from 
German historicist WERNER SOMBART, WHY IS THERE NO SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES?
(1908).
15. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE: WHY 
SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES 85–88 (2000) (examining the failure of socialism in 
America). See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA VS. EUROPE IN THE 
NEW WORLD ORDER (2003) (contrasting the different perspectives of American and European 
economics).
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economic behavior is not “who owns,” but rather “who decides.” 
Depending on the nature and extent of regulation, that question was often
answered in favor of the government.16 Coase himself acknowledged the 
point in his Nobel Prize lecture, emphasizing that in a world of zero 
transaction costs private bargaining would even establish the law itself.17
When transaction costs are positive, however, “the rights which 
individuals possess . . . will be to a large extent what the law 
determines.”18 As a result, “the legal system will have a profound effect 
on the working of the economic system and may in certain respect be said 
to control it.”19
Regulation also had one big advantage over socialism, which was its 
ability to vary the amount and nature of public control to different 
circumstances. Public ownership tends to be binary, in the sense that a 
firm is either publicly owned or it is not. By contrast, regulation permits 
the government to begin with a welfare standard and then select particular 
elements of firm activity for regulation or competition. This ability 
accounts for the economic success of most parts of the deregulation 
movement.20 Most deregulation is “partial,” in the sense that it restores 
to the market those functions thought to be best left to competition while 
leaving others within the control of regulators.
At the margin, a regulated firm could be made to behave in precisely 
the same way as a publicly-owned enterprise. Of course, regulation rarely 
approached that margin and, with the rise of deregulation,21 began to step 
back from it considerably. But the general point should be clear: 
regulation permitted policy makers to experiment with varying degrees 
of public control by not crossing that important rhetorical line into public 
ownership.
Marginalism upended many of the classical conceptions about the 
market and, in the process, about the need for regulation and the optimal 
type. The initial impact of marginalism was rapid expansion of the 
justifications for regulation as well as ideas about its scope. Later on came 
a certain amount of pushback.22 The most important issues were: (1) The 
fixed-cost controversy and the scope of natural monopoly; (2) cost 
                                                                                                                     
16. For good perspective, see Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating 
Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 551 (2000).
17. See Ronald H. Coase, Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel, NOBEL PRIZE
(Dec. 9, 1991), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/coase/lecture/
[https://perma.cc/MU2Y-W58C].
18. Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1, 
9–10 (Univ. of Chi. Law, Occasional Paper No. 28, 1992).
19. Id. at 10.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
22. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 320.
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classification, incentives, and ratemaking; (3) the changing domain of 
market failure and regulation or Pigouvian taxation as correctives; (4)
market diversity and the rise of sector regulation; (5) deregulation; (6)
concerns about the distribution of wealth; (7) the development of cost-
benefit analysis; and (8) the assessment of risk.
The marginalist revolution made modern, sector-specific agency 
regulation inevitable, at least within the framework that marginalist 
economics chose.23 To be sure, the development of regulatory agencies 
is historically contingent. One can also imagine a world in which we have 
fewer of them or in which their jurisdictional boundaries over subject 
matter or geography differ from the arrangements that we have. Clearly, 
however, the complexity of issues created by marginalism, including 
accounting for risk and distributional concerns, appeared to require 
greater expertise in determining the need for and the type of government 
intervention. It is one thing to roll back the clock on regulation; it is quite 
another to roll it back on marginalism itself.
Marginalism imposed a significant measure of subjective choice into 
theories of market behavior, and thus into policy making. The conception 
of markets in nineteenth century political economy was that they were an 
objective part of the laws of nature.24 Classical political economists spoke 
of the laws of the economy as a part of natural law.25 A popular nineteenth 
century American text initially written by Brown University’s Francis 
Wayland and later edited by Aaron Chapin, President of Beloit College, 
declared that:
Political Economy is that branch of Social Science which 
treats the production and application of wealth to the well-
being of men in society. It is a branch of true science.
By Science, as the word is here used, we mean a
Systematic arrangement of the laws which God has 
established, so far as they have been discovered, of any 
department of human knowledge.26
Marginalism and the regulatory policy that resulted were stunningly 
different from this conception of economic science. Nearly every 
decision to regulate leads to a menu of policy choices, and it is not always 
clear that one works better than another. Further, different approaches 
may work better in different environments. Regulation often invites 
experimentation and, necessarily, criticism about the amount or the 
                                                                                                                     
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 307–09.
25. E.g., HENRY WOOD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW 18–19 (1894).
26. FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 4 (Aaron L. Chapin ed., 
1886) (1837) (emphasis omitted).
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particular direction regulation has taken. Just to give one example, the 
perceived need for regulation of the business corporation and its 
shareholders or creditors began to loom large during the Gilded Age, 
particularly in the “watered stock” scandals. The regulatory experiments 
that resulted included state “blue sky” laws,27 and in the federal 
government the U.S. Industrial Commission (1898–1902), the Federal 
Bureau of Corporations and Federal Trade Commission (1903–1915), 
and eventually the Securities Act and the founding of the Securities 
Exchange Commission (1933–1934). Each of these experiments took 
more control of the corporation from its shareholders and placed it under 
an agency.
Also inherent in marginalism’s emphasis on expectations was greatly 
increased use of mathematics. As a result, the initial division between 
traditionalists and marginalists was generational. Older economists 
lacked the training in mathematics that the new economics required, and 
they naturally resisted it.28 The models that marginalist economists
developed took expected value and risk into account. Because pricing 
decisions are made at the margin, neoclassical economics provided a 
technical basis for dividing the behavior of markets or firms into shorter 
or longer “runs,” or time periods. It produced technical cost 
classifications into long-run and short-run costs, including the 
development of the marginal cost curve, perhaps the most distinctive 
mathematical feature of marginalism.29 The marginal revenue curve came 
a generation later.30
Closely related was increased attention to the theory of competition,
and increasing awareness that “perfect” competition is the exception 
rather than the rule. Rather, competition exists on a continuum,
depending mainly on the number of firms, the types of costs that each 
firm faces, and the nature of its products.31 The full implications had to 
                                                                                                                     
27. See, e.g., William W. Cook, “Watered Stock”—Commissions—“Blue Sky Laws”—
Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REV. 583, 584, 590 (1921) (exemplifying prominent Gilded 
Age corporate law treatise author advocating state blue sky statutes); see also LOUIS LOSS &
EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAWS 3–10 (1958) (providing an in-depth discussion of the blue 
sky laws); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses,
46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 230–32 (2003) (further analyzing blue sky laws).
28. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 75–76.
29. See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 313. 
30. The construction of the marginal revenue curve is generally attributed to Joan Robinson, 
occasionally with Edward H. Chamberlin as an independent discoverer. See JOAN ROBINSON, THE 
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 182–96 (1933) (illustrating the marginal revenue curve); 
see also EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 178–93 (1933); 
Alfred S. Eichner, Joan Robinson’s Legacy, 27 CHALLENGE 42 (1984) (stressing the importance 
of Robinson’s contributions).
31. George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 
1–3 (1957).
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await the early 1930s and the work of Joan Robinson and Edward 
Chamberlin on imperfect and monopolistic competition.32 Joseph 
Schumpeter had the prescience to see this in the mid-thirties, in a review 
of Joan Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition.33 Prior to that 
time economists had treated competition and monopoly as the only 
market structures worth systematic examination, and everything in 
between as “an academic curiosity.”34 However, if this intermediate 
range should emerge as dominant, then the traditional laissez faire 
assumption that markets should be left alone could cease to hold true. 
Instead, the circumstances under which governmental action could 
increase welfare “becomes so extended as to make these cases the rule 
rather than more or less curious exceptions.”35
Closely related was the concept of uncertainty—and relatedly, risk—
which developed naturally out of theories that identified value with future 
expectations rather than past averages.36 The revolution in corporate 
finance provides a good example.37 Under the classical theory any judge 
who knew a little arithmetic and basic concepts of property valuation 
could decide whether stock was “watered,” which meant that its stated 
par value exceeded the actual value historically paid in.38 Answering that 
question required a judge to determine the amount of paid in cash and 
noncash capital and divide by the number of shares. The biggest problem 
was overstatement of the value of noncash property.39 But the marginalist 
theory that a firm’s value is a function of anticipated profitability was far 
more complex, requiring considerable information about the firm itself
and its products and management, the value and duration of its 
intellectual property portfolio and other productive assets, the market in 
which the firm operated, and the valuation of uncertain future events.
The initial effect of marginalism was to weaken the classical view 
that nearly all markets work well, and opinions about the robustness of 
                                                                                                                     
32. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 30 (discussing distribution, allocation, and 
exploitation); CHAMBERLIN, supra note 30 (discussing competition between different types of 
firms).
33. Joseph A. Schumpeter & A.J. Nichol, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect Competition,
42 J. POL. ECON. 249, 250–51 (1934).
34. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 207–08
35. Schumpeter & Nichol, supra note 33, at 251.
36. Among the most prophetic was FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT
(1921).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7.
38. E.g., Lehigh Ave. Ry., 18 A. 498, 500 (Pa. 1889) (stating stock certificate “stands in the 
hands of the subscriber for so much as, and no more than, the amount actually paid upon it”).
39. E.g., Gillett v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 82 N.E. 891, 904–05 (Ill. 1907) (holding a 
promoter’s contribution of an unwritten play and an unpatented invention not worth the $2 million 
evaluation placed on them); cf. Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. 413, 416–17 (1856) (holding the 
contribution of coal mining property at appraised value was permitted, given that there was no 
evidence suggesting that the appraisal was fraudulent).
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markets differed widely, depending on assumptions about such things as 
the distribution of fixed and variable costs, the flow of information, or the 
degree and nature of risk or uncertainty that the firm faced. This in turn 
led increasingly to the view that markets differ from one another, and that 
many would work better if the state applied a corrective. In other words, 
marginalism provided a rationale for both a vastly increased amount of 
government intervention in the economy and the idea that the type of 
intervention should vary from one market to another. As with many 
revisionist ideas, its early history reflected positions that were later 
thought to be extreme, once marginalism became more normalized in 
economic and regulatory theory.
I. FIXED COSTS, EQUILIBRIUM, AND NATURAL MONOPOLY
One of the most important issues confronting neoclassical regulatory 
theory was determining the range of industries and firms to which price 
regulation should be applied. Policy makers needed to know whether an 
industry equilibrium with satisfactory results could be achieved without 
state intervention.
Among Alfred Marshall’s most significant contributions to 
neoclassical price theory was his development of partial equilibrium 
analysis, which examined a portion of the economy limited to a single 
“commodity” or finite time period. Marshall realized that in an economy 
everything affects everything else. Nevertheless, he argued for the 
importance of studying a specific product over a limited time period,
assuming that changes in demand and supply for that product had no 
effect on other goods. In defending this approach he wrote:
The forces to be dealt with are however so numerous, that it 
is best to take a few at a time; and to work out a number of 
partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study. Thus we 
begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand 
and price in regard to a particular commodity. We reduce to 
inaction all other forces by the phrase “other things being 
equal”: we do not suppose that they are inert, but for the time 
we ignore their activity. This scientific device is a great deal 
older than science: it is the method by which, consciously or 
unconsciously, sensible men have dealt from time 
immemorial with every difficult problem of ordinary life.40
Marshall was unable to get an equilibrium in a competitive market,
however, if the firms in it experienced significant fixed costs.41
                                                                                                                     
40. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS xiv (8th ed. 1949).
41. See, e.g., Renee Prendergast, Increasing Returns and Competitive Equilibrium—the 
Content and Development of Marshall’s Theory, 16 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 447, 447 (1992).
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Competition would drive prices to marginal cost, which covers only 
variable costs.42 The firms in such a market would be forced to charge 
prices so low that they could not stay in business.
One result of Marshall’s dilemma was that economists became 
embroiled in a significant “fixed cost” controversy, in which economists 
and lawyers debated both the meaning and the policy implications of high 
fixed costs.43 In antitrust for example, firms argued that in industries with 
high fixed costs competition would be “ruinous,” forcing firms out of 
business until only a monopolist survived.44 Otherwise they would be 
forced to collude or merge.45 The economics literature produced many 
studies involving long- vs. short-period sales, the availability of price 
discrimination, or other theories attempting to explain how fixed costs 
could be consistent with stable competition.46 By and large, these studies 
assumed that the products in question were commodities, and thus the 
only variable for consumer choice was price.
The policy responses were less extreme than the literature. First, the 
Supreme Court consistently rejected “ruinous competition” as a defense 
in antitrust cases, all of which involved fungible products or services.47
The principal industry that came under price regulation as a result of the 
controversy was the railroads, where fixed costs were so high that they 
were thought to create natural monopolies across a wide range of 
situations.48 The issue was also raised in the cast-iron pipe price fixing 
case, but both the Sixth Circuit in Judge Taft’s well known opinion and 
the Supreme Court rejected it there as well.49 There is reason to believe
that the Supreme Court’s hostility toward cartels in high fixed cost 
industries either led to or exacerbated the first great American merger 
                                                                                                                     
42. Id.
43. For an account of the debate in the United States and its effect on developing antitrust 
policy, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 308–22.
44. Id. at 313–22. 
45. See, e.g., Eliot Jones, Is Competition in Industry Ruinous?, 34 Q.J. ECON. 473, 473–74 
(1920).
46. One of the most prescient was the largely ignored JOHN M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS 416–17 (1923). See also Spurgeon Bell, Fixed Costs and Market 
Price, 32 Q.J. ECON. 507, 509–22 (1918) (explaining the effects of fixed costs on market price in 
certain industries); Frank H. Knight, Cost of Production and Price over Long and Short Periods,
29 J. POL. ECON. 304, 304–10 (1921) (analyzing short-time and long-time economic problems).
47. See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 329–30 (1897) (rejecting 
the defense); accord United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 519–23, 547–48, 569 
(1898).
48. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5 at 315–16.
49. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898) (rejecting 
“ruinous competition” defense), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211, 235–36 (1899).
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movement, in which many firms with high fixed costs were forced to 
merge because antitrust law left them unable to collude.50
Alfred Marshall’s own solution to the fixed cost problem was widely 
regarded as unacceptable. Borrowing from biology, he reasoned that 
firms were like trees in a forest. The “representative firm” went through 
a finite life cycle, growing in the earlier part, maturing, and eventually 
withering away.51 As a result there would not be durable monopoly but 
rather ongoing cycling of firms.52 Marshall wrote in his Eighth edition:
[T]he very conditions of an industry which enable a new firm 
to attain quickly command over new economies of 
production, render that firm liable to be supplanted quickly 
by still younger firms with yet newer methods. Especially 
where the powerful economies of production on a large scale 
are associated with the use of new appliances and new 
methods, a firm which has lost the exceptional energy which 
enabled it to rise, is likely ere long quickly to decay; and the 
full life of a large firm seldom lasts very long.53
This passage indicates that Marshall was aware of the role of 
innovation (“newer methods”) in upsetting equilibrium and perhaps even 
making the search for equilibrium less important. But Marshall himself 
did not go very far down this road.54
One limitation on his biological theory of the life of a representative 
firm, Marshall acknowledged, might be joint stock companies, or 
corporations, which did not necessarily go through this ageing cycle.
However, Marshall persisted in the view that such companies were 
inherently inferior mechanisms of production, largely because of 
problems relating to the separation of ownership and control.55
                                                                                                                     
50. E.g., NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS,
1895–1904, at 27–33 (1985); see also LESTER G. TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE 387 
(1978) (providing a mathematic perspective). See generally George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing 
Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201 
(1982) (introducing the question of what role Addyston Pipe played in the merger wave); George 
Bittlingmayer, Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger Wave?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 77 (1985) 
(positing that mergers were legal while cartels were not).
51. See G. F. Shove, The Representative Firm and Increasing Returns, 40 ECON. J. 94, 114
(1930).
52. For a good discussion, see Neil Hart, Marshall’s Theory of Value: The Role of External 
Economies, 20 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 353, 360–62 (1996).
53. MARSHALL, supra note 40, at 287.
54. That largely awaited Schumpeter. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (1942).
55. MARSHALL, supra note 40, at 303 (stating shareholders are generally unable “to exercise 
an effective and wise control over the general management of the business”); id. at 303–04
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Most of Marshall’s intellectual descendants did not follow him into 
this biological forest. Rather, they looked for solutions to the fixed cost 
problem in two quite different places. Both were driven by the 
mathematics of marginalism rather than biological analogies. First was 
the idea that the long run average cost curve might be U-shaped rather 
than continuously downward sloping. The second was the availability of 
product differentiation and, eventually, monopolistic competition.
The proposition of U-shaped long run average cost is simply that scale 
economies do not produce increasing returns indefinitely. Rather, at some 
point the curve bottoms out and either remains flat or begins to rise. In 
that case the equilibrium number of firms in a market with fixed costs can 
be more than one, depending on the size of the market. For example, if 
average fixed costs decline only to an output level of 1000 and market 
demand at that level is 10,000 units, then this market has room for up to 
10 technically efficient firms. This idea developed gradually in writings 
by Marshall’s successor Arthur C. Pigou, and Francis Edgeworth, Piero 
Sraffa, and Jacob Viner.56 Pigou in particular showed that when the 
supply price of the industry is higher than the marginal cost of a firm, that 
firm would expand until these costs were equalized. When a firm was in 
equilibrium, its marginal costs would equal the industry’s supply curve. 
Firms could be expected to jockey for growth by competing to reduce 
costs.57
Of course, the fact that a U-shaped cost curve is possible does not 
mean that it explains every situation. If the market is sufficiently small in 
relation to the availability of scale economies, there still might be room 
for only one firm. The other major development that addressed the 
equilibrium problem was the idea that firms differ from one another in 
geographic58 and product space. The development of the idea of product 
                                                                                                                     
(discussing Marshall’s highly suspicious account of corporations, and particularly the rise of the 
“trust” in the United States).
56. For the development of this concept, see generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS 
OF WELFARE (3d ed. 1929); Piero Sraffa, On the Relations Between Cost and Quantity Produced
(translated from French “Sulle Relazioni fra Costo e Quantità Prodotta”), 11 ANNALI DI 
ECONOMIA 277 (1925); Piero Sraffa, The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions, 36 
ECON. J. 535 (1926); Jacob Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, 2 J. ECON. 23 (1932). For a 
discussion of this development, see generally Francis Y. Edgeworth, Contribution to the Theory 
of Railway Rates – IV, 23 ECON. J. 206 (1913) (depicting the U-shape); and Jan Horst Keppler & 
Jerome Lallement, The Origins of the U-Shaped Average Cost Curve: Understanding the 
Complexities of the Modern Theory of the Firm, 38 HIST. POL. ECON. 733 (2006) (identifying the 
earliest graphic depiction in Francis Y. Edgeworth). 
57. Arthur C. Pigou, An Analysis of Supply, 38 ECON. J. 238, 252 (1928); see Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 
506 (2011).
58. See generally Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929) 
(discussing differentiation in geographic space).
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differentiation, and most particularly of monopolistic competition theory 
in the 1930s, very largely ended the fixed cost controversy.59 Under 
monopolistic competition firms compete not only in pricing but also by 
differentiating their product in order to appeal to specific consumer tastes. 
Edward Chamberlin was able to show that even with easy entry and high 
fixed costs it was possible to have an equilibrium if products were 
differentiated.60
The theory of monopolistic competition accomplished two things for 
regulatory policy. First was its assurance that at least in the world of 
manufactured products rather than commodities, ruinous competition and 
collusion or merger to monopoly were not inevitable. Rather, this became 
a problem of degree. Second, however, was the realization that 
monopolistic competition was not perfect either. Prices were higher than 
marginal cost. Further, firms under monopolistic competition dedicated
considerable resources toward product differentiation, leading to the view 
that product differentiation was “excessive.” This led to discussions of 
such topics as whether annual style changes in the automobile industry 
should be regarded as an unfair method of competition.61 Relatedly, the 
intellectual property laws were thought to be harmful to the extent that 
they facilitated such differentiation. The decades following the New Deal 
saw rapid expansion of antitrust policy accompanied by considerable 
hostility toward intellectual property rights, most notably patents and 
trademarks.62 Chamberlin himself advocated widespread trademark 
infringement as a device for permitting firms to compete more effectively 
by making it more difficult for producers to differentiate their brands.63
                                                                                                                     
59. See BLAUG, supra note 1, 391–96.
60. E.g., John R. Hicks, Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 11 (1935); Arthur Smithies, Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition, 55 Q.J.
ECON. 95, 95 (1940).
61. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY, H.R. DOC. NO. 76-
468, at 365–418 (1939). The issues are summarized in Note, Annual Style Change in the 
Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method of Competition, 80 YALE L.J. 567 (1971). In its main 
brief to the Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe Merger Case, the government argued that rapid 
style changes in the shoe industry made it very difficult for smaller shoe manufacturers to 
compete. Brief for the United States at 15, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
(No. 4).
62. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 198–200, 227–28, 288–89.
63. EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A RE-
ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE app. E (5th ed. 1946); see also Edward H. Chamberlin, 
Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 90–92 (1950) (concluding that 
the consequences of product heterogeneity have been ignored or misunderstood). For a modern 
perspective, see generally Christopher S. Yoo, Intellectual Property and the Economics of 
Product Differentiation, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., forthcoming 2019), https://scholarship.law.
upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3017&context=faculty_scholarship.
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In any event, the ruinous competition problem itself became largely 
relegated to common carriers such as the railroads, public utilities, and 
other transport firms. It has reappeared from time to time in antitrust price 
fixing case law, only to be rejected. The most recent is the United States 
v. Apple, Inc.64 eBooks decision, which rejected the publishers’ argument 
that ruinous competition in electronic books justified their collective 
agreement to raise prices and impose these on Amazon.65 That market, 
just as the railroads, involved a technology with very high fixed costs and 
variable (distribution) costs near zero, except for royalties.66 One 
important dissimilarity, however, was product fungibility. Book titles are 
differentiated to the extent that most do not compete with each other on 
the consumer end. As a result, as long as they are under copyright, 
successful titles will sell at profitable prices even under high fixed costs. 
Once copyright has expired, the equilibrium price is close to zero.67
One important but overhyped idea that originated in the 1960s and 
1970s was that even firms with very high fixed costs, including utilities, 
could operate competitively if competition were seen as being “for” 
rather than “in” the market. Even if a market has room for only one seller 
at a time, competition to be that seller might keep prices at the 
competitive level without regulation. The basic theory had already 
appeared in “potential competition” antitrust cases.68 It was also implicit 
in the common law of requirements contracts. For example, a store owner 
might prefer to have one person plow snow on an as needed basis over 
the course of a season, rather than taking bids for each snowstorm. Courts 
have approved such contracts since the Gilded Age.69 Even though there 
is only one snow plower over the year, the price is competitive because 
prospective sellers must bid and rebid for that contract, or franchise.
                                                                                                                     
64. 791 F.3d 290 (2d. Cir. 2015).
65. Id. at 333, 334; see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 
FLA. L. REV. 419, 437–38 (2016) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Information]; Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and the Design of Production, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1155, 1202, 1204 (2018)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Design].
66. Hovenkamp, Design, supra note 65, at 1203. 
67. See Hovenkamp, Information, supra note 65, at 426–27 (noting the example of 
scholarly journals, which command high prices even though they are distributed electronically 
and the authors obtain no royalties).
68. See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1964) 
(concluding that two firms bidding on wholesale natural gas to Los Angeles should be regarded 
as competitors for merger purposes, even though only one of them had made any sales there).
69. E.g., Fontaine v. Baxley, 17 S.E. 1015, 1018 (Ga. 1892) (upholding requirements 
contract requiring plaintiffs to sell its full output of railroad ties to the defendant); J. Winslow 
Jones & Co. v. Binford, 74 Me. 439, 442, 443 (1883) (upholding requirements contract requiring 
defendant to sell its full output of sweet corn to the plaintiff); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
at 126–29.
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The late Harold Demsetz famously queried, why could not the same 
principle apply to public utilities?70 Of course, the snow plower’s truck
can readily be moved from one site to another, permitting the market for 
plowing snow on a particular parking lot to be very competitive, provided 
that the prospective snow plowers do not collude. As Oliver Williamson 
countered, however, as soon we consider utilities that have durable and 
nonmoveable infrastructures, such as power, cable, or gas lines, the 
problem becomes much more complex.71 The winner of the first round 
would have a significant bidding advantage over any prospective entrant 
who would have to purchase or re-install the infrastructure. Alternatively, 
some mechanism might be established for transferring the infrastructure
from the incumbent to the new winner, or perhaps a government such as 
a state or municipality could own the system, with successive firms 
simply bidding to be its operators for successive periods.72
William Baumol, one of the most enthusiastic of “contestable market”
proponents, proclaimed this idea of competition for the market to be “An
Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure.”73 To be sure, the theory of 
contestable markets was an important contribution to regulatory theory.
However, as a policy matter it never lived up to expectations. Much of 
the technical theory turned into a discussion of cost classification—
mainly, which costs were variable, which were fixed, and which were 
“sunk.”74 The later type was crucial. Even a high fixed cost need not 
interfere with contestability if the asset in question, such as the snow 
plowing truck, is readily and costlessly transferrable from one market to 
another. For obvious reasons, much of the theory focused on the airline 
industry. Although aircrafts are costly and durable, if they can easily be 
transferred from one market to another in response to diverging prices the 
result should be competition. But this theory of “hit and run” entry largely 
overlooked details such as the very substantial cost of airports, gate space 
leases, and other items that were not so readily transferable.75 Institutions, 
                                                                                                                     
70. See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 55 (1968).
71. See Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in General and 
with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 85 (1976).
72. Id. at 90, 102 (arguing that “franchise bidding for incomplete long-term contracts is a 
much more dubious undertaking than Demsetz’ discussion suggests,” but suggesting that markets 
such as “[l]ocal service airlines” and “postal delivery” might work).
73. William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry 
Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1982). The theory was expanded and later published in 
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
(1982).
74. See, e.g., Don Coursey et al., Market Contestability in the Presence of Sunk (Entry) 
Costs, 15 RAND J. ECON. 69, 70–71 (1984). 
75. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: EFFECTS OF AIRLINE 
MARKET CONCENTRATION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY ON AIRFARES 13 (1991), 
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it seems, always get in the way. The effect of deregulation of airlines has 
not been contestability, but rather imperfect competition or oligopoly 
among competitors, with frequent claims of price fixing. The literature 
generally shows an inverse correlation between price and the number of 
carriers on a route—which is inconsistent with contestability but quite 
consistent with oligopoly or collusion.76 From a consumer welfare 
perspective, price competition among competing carriers is very likely 
much superior to the previous regime of price regulation by the now
defunct Civil Aeronautics Board, but it is a far cry from contestability.
II. RETURN-BASED RATEMAKING
The historical rationale for rate regulation had been that certain firms 
were “affected with a publick interest,” in the words of Lord Justice 
Matthew Hale, because of their location as gateways to commerce.77 He 
made that argument in reference to strategically located English seaports
which held effective monopolies in their service area.78 The United States 
Supreme Court quoted Hale in upholding state price regulation of grain 
elevators strategically located along railroad tracks.79 Blackstone’s less 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/214117.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVB3-2SQC] (explaining that 
under deregulation, airline markets still exhibit higher prices as they become more concentrated, 
indicating lack of contestability).
76. See, e.g., Federico Ciliberto et al., Collusive Pricing Patterns in the US Airline Industry,
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 15), https://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S0167718717304125 [https://perma.cc/3DXM-66ZU]; Gaurab Aryal et al.,
Public Communication and Collusion in the Airline Industry 27 (Becker Friedman Inst. for 
Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 2018-11, 2018), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/sites/default/
files/research/WP_No.2018-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JKS-GXSS].
77. LORD CHIEF-JUSTICE HALE, De Portibus Maris, in A TREATISE, IN THREE PARTS (c. 
1670), reprinted in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 45, 77–78
(Francis Hargrave ed., 1787).
78. Id.
79. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 127, 129, 154 (1876). The Court quoted De Portibus 
Maris as follows:
A man, for his own private advantage, may, in a port or town, set up a wharf or 
crane, and may take what rates he and his customers can agree for cranage, 
wharfage, housellage, pesage; for he doth no more than is lawful for any man to 
do, viz., makes the most of his own. . . . If the king or subject have a public wharf, 
unto which all persons that come to that port must come and unlade or lade their 
goods as for the purpose, because they are the wharfs only licensed by the 
king, . . . or because there is no other wharf in that port, as it may fall out where 
a port is newly erected; in that case there cannot be taken arbitrary and excessive 
duties for cranage, wharfage, pesage, &c., neither can they be enhanced to an 
immoderate rate; but the duties must be reasonable and moderate, though settled 
by the king's license or charter. For now the wharf and crane and other 
conveniences are affected with a public interest, and they cease to be juris 
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sophisticated justification for regulation used the term “king’s 
prerogative” as opposed to “common callings.”80 Anyone could engage 
in a common calling, but only the Crown could authorize someone to
exercise one of its prerogatives, which became the subject of exclusive 
grants and, in many cases, prices set by the government.81
What distinguished these special firms was both that they were 
essential to commerce and that competition was not believed to be 
possible because the market terrain, whether physical or economic, 
permitted only one firm. Under marginalism, this rationale shifted to the 
one developed in the previous section—namely, that the firms had very 
high fixed costs tending toward natural monopoly. As a result, any market 
with multiple suppliers would be threatened with ruinous competition.
More technically, the long run average cost curve sloped downward 
continuously for such a distance that the optimal number of sustainable 
firms in a market was one. That fact provided a rationale for both
monopoly status and price regulation, leaving the question of how to 
select the proper price.
This neoclassical economic rationale for monopoly rate regulation
was significantly narrower than the common law classification scheme
that Blackstone embraced. He supported legally enforced monopoly 
status for things that were almost certainly not natural monopolies, but 
merely sellers regarded as needing protection from “excessive” 
competition. For example, according to Blackstone, at common law a 
retail market authorized by the local Lord was entitled to protection from 
competition for a seven-mile radius from its location, which was one-
third of a day’s journey.82 As late as 1827, the Court of King’s Bench 
held it unlawful for the defendant to sell fish from his house within the 
specified distance from an authorized local market.83 In his 1812
Livingston v. Van Ingen84 decision involving a state issued steamboat 
patent, New York’s Chancellor Kent opined that the government 
prerogative to grant exclusive charters for “beneficial public purposes” 
was clear.85 Further, “[a]ll our bank charters, turnpike, canal and bridge 
                                                                                                                     
privati only . . . .
Id. at 127 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting HALE, supra note 77, at 77–78).
80. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 79 (1765–1769).
81. See Barry E. Hawk, English Competition Law Before 1900, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 350, 
368 (2018); William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI.
L. REV. 355, 368 (1954).
82. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at 218–19.
83. Mosley v. Walker (1827) 108 Eng. Rep. 640, 642.
84. 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812), overruled by N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 
182 (N.Y. 1825).
85. Id. at 573.  
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companies, ferries, markets, &c. are grants of exclusive privileges . . . .”86
He also acknowledged that the extent of these grants might be 
“inexpedient or unwise,” but that did not undermine the state’s power to 
grant them.87 His list included some things that could have been natural 
monopolies (canals and bridges) but others (banks and public markets) 
that almost certainly were not.88 Although Livingston was a patent 
decision, most of these examples also did not come close to satisfying 
any “novelty” requirement that patent law assesses today. A few, 
however, were consistent with the British view, which a few American 
colonies and states had adopted, that patents should be awarded not 
merely to inventors, but also to those that introduced existing technology 
or products into a new area.89
The American theory of price regulated monopoly went through three 
distinct stages between the early national period and World War II, each 
one strongly influenced by the economic theory of the day. Prior to the 
Jacksonian revolution the prevailing theory among Federalists and Whigs 
was that monopoly grants, often coupled with price regulation, were 
essential for encouraging economic development. This was Blackstone’s 
position and also that of the American Federalists as reflected in 
Chancellor Kent’s Livingston decision and Justice Story’s dissent in the 
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge90 case.91 The Jacksonian 
revolution, which got underway in the 1830s, introduced a classical 
economic theory that was hostile toward monopoly of all kinds and 
believed that the market itself was sufficient to incentivize any 
worthwhile project.92 After the turn of the twentieth century, 
neoclassicism substituted a more nuanced theory driven by the nature of 
a firm’s costs and its optimal size in relation to its market. The 
neoclassical theory, which largely survives to this day, allows 
considerably more room for regulation than Jacksonian classicism had, 
but less than early national Federalist ideology embraced.93
Through all three periods, exclusive grants to public service 
companies were usually accompanied by price regulation. Prior to the 




89. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIZ.
L. REV. 263, 276, 283 (2016). When federal patent law began to require novelty as a condition of 
patentability roughly a third of challenged patents were declared invalid on that ground. Id. at 
276.
90. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
91. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Inventing the Classical Constitution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21 
(2015); supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
92. Hovenkamp, supra note 91, at 4–5.
93. Id. at 7.
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Gilded Age, however, the prices were typically stipulated in a particular 
grantee’s corporate charter rather than applied by legislation to the market 
as a whole.94 In the 1837 Charles River Bridge case the plaintiff’s charter 
authorizing a toll bridge stipulated the tolls that it could charge.95 The 
charter did not expressly guarantee a monopoly right, however. Erection 
of the bridge had been costly and was regarded as a substantial feat of 
engineering.96 The plaintiff had argued that government-mandated spatial 
separation of toll bridges was necessary in order to prevent ruinous 
competition between them.97 Justice McLean accepted that argument in 
his dissent, observing that “great risk and expense were incurred” in its 
construction, and that “[t]he unrestricted profits contemplated, were 
necessary to induce or justify the undertaking.”98
                                                                                                                     
94. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 125–30.
95. STANLEY KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER 
BRIDGE CASE 9–10, 32–45 (1971). The charter stipulated:
Each foot passenger (or one person passing), two-thirds of a penny; one person 
and horse, two pence two-thirds of a penny; single horse cart or sled, or sley, four 
pence; wheelbarrows, hand-carts, and other vehicles capable of carrying like 
weight, one penny, one-third of a penny; single horse and chaise, or sulkey, eight 
pence; coaches, chariots, phaetons and curricles, one shilling each; all other 
wheel carriages or sleds drawn by more than one beast, six pence; meat cattle 
and horses passing the said bridge, exclusive of those rode or in carriages or 
teams, one penny, one-third of a penny; swine and sheep, four pence for each 
dozen, and at the same rate for a greater or less number; and in all cases the same 
toll shall be paid for all carriages and vehicles passing the said bridge, whether 
the same be loaded or not loaded; and to each team one man and no more shall 
be allowed as a driver to pass free from payment of toll, and in all cases double 
toll shall be paid on the Lord’s day; and at all times when the toll gatherer shall 
not attend his duty the gate or gates shall be left open.
Id. at 10. The 1868 monopoly charter at issue in the Slaughter-House Cases also stipulated the 
rates in the charter itself. Section 7 of the Charter provided:
That all persons slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered, cattle or other animals 
in said slaughter-houses, shall pay to the said company or corporation the 
following rates or perquisites, viz.: For all beeves, $1 each; for all hogs and 
calves, 50 cents each; for all sheep, goats, and lambs, 30 cents each . . . .
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 42 (1872). The entire charter is reproduced at the beginning 
of the Court’s opinion. Id. at 36–38. 
96. See Charles River Bridge v.  Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 562 (1837) (McLean, 
J., dissenting) (“When the Charles River bridge was built, it was considered a work of great 
magnitude. It was, perhaps, the first experiment made to throw a bridge of such length over an 
arm of the sea . . . .”).
97. Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
98. Id. at 562 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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However, the closely divided Court held that the Constitution’s 
Contract Clause did not require that an exclusive right should be 
implied.99 Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Taney famously wrote 
that “in grants by the public, nothing passes by implication.”100 The 
Court’s split reflected a sharp economic division by Federalists such as 
Story and the new and more classical Jacksonians over the use of 
exclusive rights to encourage the development of infrastructure. Justice 
Story complained in his dissent that he could “conceive of no surer plan 
to arrest all public improvements, founded on private capital and 
enterprise, than to make the outlay of that capital uncertain and 
questionable.”101
The two central features of the modern public utility—a monopoly 
grant and regulated rates—were thus in place long prior to the marginalist 
revolution.102 The Charles River Bridge approach of stipulating the rates 
in the corporate charter created some serious problems, however. 
Because the rates were specific to each firm they could vary from one 
situation to the next. Further, because the rates were stipulated in the 
charter they could not be changed without legislative revision. That might 
have been acceptable for a wooden toll bridge in a zero inflation 
environment, but it never would have worked for more modern utilities 
that had changing costs. So price regulation migrated from corporate 
charters to statutes that accommodated more frequent changes.103 This 
occurred during the emergent Substantive Due Process era, which was 
generally hostile toward state imposed regulation of prices. It also meant, 
however, that the modern theory of rate-of-return price regulation 
occurred simultaneously with the early development of marginalism.
The Supreme Court approved statutory price regulation in principle in 
Munn v. Illinois,104 although it did not consider whether the Constitution 
required any limitations.105 In Munn there was no charter in which rates 
could be specified, because Munn & Scott was a common law 
                                                                                                                     
99. Id. at 466 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 546.
101. Id. at 608 (Story, J., dissenting); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, 
and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1268–92
(1984).
102. On the legal evolution see HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 125–30.
103. Id.
104. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
105. Id. at 136.
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partnership.106 In the Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler107 case in 
1884, the Supreme Court again approved statutory rate regulation, in this 
case of water rates by a privately operated, incorporated water works
whose charter did not specify rates.108 The statute required that water 
rates be “reasonable,” and created a commission to determine 
reasonableness.109 In approving this procedure, however, the court
warned that it was reserving judgment on the possibility that such a 
commission might set a “manifestly unreasonable” rate.110 Justice Field 
was the lone dissenter, complaining that the plaintiff was incorporated, 
and imposing rates on it after the fact violated the Contract Clause.111
Finally, in 1898 the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited a state from imposing a railroad rate that generated less than 
“fair value” on the railroad’s property.112
While the Interstate Commerce Commission had been created in 
1887, it did not have full authority to set rates until 1920.113 Prior to that, 
most rate regulation befell the states. The statutory or administrative 
setting of rates in price regulated industries had always involved some 
kind of notion that rates must be “above cost,” sufficient to give the 
regulated firm a reasonable rate of return.114 A major contribution of 
marginalist price theory was to provide a cost classification system that 
aided regulators in establishing theoretically workable rates of return. It 
did not do so well, however, in establishing the Constitution’s minimum 
standard of reasonableness.
Aside from sporadic attempts to regulate commodity prices, price 
regulation prior to the Civil War was largely ad hoc, negotiated on an 
individual firm basis. By contrast, neoclassical price theory sorted 
industries by cost structure. In 1887, the same year that the Interstate 
Commerce Act was passed, Henry Carter Adams wrote an important 
article classifying industries into three groups: those with decreasing 
                                                                                                                     
106. See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 569 (1886) (“[T]he case 
of Munn v. Illinois was selected by the [C]ourt as the most appropriate one in which to give its 
opinions on that subject, because that case presented the question of a private citizen, or 
unincorporated partnership . . . .”).
107. 110 U.S. 347 (1884).
108. Id. at 356.
109. Id. at 353.
110. Id. at 354.
111. Id. at 369 (Field, J., dissenting).
112. Smyth v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898); see also Robert L. Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth 
v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1116 (1942). For a contemporary defense of agency rate 
regulation, see generally Adelbert Moot, Railway Rate Regulation, 19 HARV. L. REV. 487 (1906).
113. Transportation Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-152, 41 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
114. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Legal Thought, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 
662 (2015).
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returns to scale, those with constant returns to scale, and those with 
increasing returns to scale.115 For industries in the third classification, he 
argued, competition could not be relied on to make firms perform well.116
Firms with higher output would have lower costs than smaller ones, 
leading to a monopoly unless they were constrained.117 Adams’s principal 
example of such industries was the railroads.118
Much of the early neoclassical theory of cost-based price regulation 
developed in debates over the proper treatment of railroads, an industry 
that was tailor-made for study of the marginalist economics of cost.119
The railroads had very high fixed costs for land, track networks, and 
equipment, but also significant operating (variable) costs, including fuel 
and labor.120 Left to itself, the market appeared not to do a very good job 
of providing the conditions for competitive equilibrium.121 If a line was 
too isolated its owners would earn monopoly returns.122 State officials 
often responded by chartering additional railroads, resulting in significant 
overbuilding and complaints about “ruinous competition” already in the 
1890s.123 Because most shipping services were fungible, excess capacity 
tended to drive rates to marginal cost, without enough remaining to 
amortize fixed costs. In this atmosphere it is no wonder that several 
economists and legal writers advocated “pooling,” which was essentially 
cartelization of competing railroads.124 Indeed, both the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Eighth Circuit had approved the very 
rate-setting pool that the Supreme Court condemned in its first antitrust 
decision on the merits, the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight 
Ass’n125 case in 1897.126
                                                                                                                     
115. For this article, see generally Henry C. Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action,
1 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N, Jan. 1887, at 1, 55.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 60. 
118. Id. at 61.
119. Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1035–36 (1988).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1035–37.
122. See id. at 1031–32, 1035–36.
123. See discussion supra notes 47–48.
124. E.g., Arthur T. Hadley, The Prohibition of Railway Pools, 4 Q.J. ECON. 158, 158–61, 
164 (1890); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law II, 2 POL.
SCI. Q. 369, 373, 378–80 (1887). For further discussion see generally Hovenkamp, supra note 
119.
125. 58 F. 58 (1893), rev’d, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
126. Id. at 76–77 (“To make railroads of the greatest possible service to the country, contract 
relations would be essential, because there would need to be joint tariffs, joint running 
arrangements and interchange of cars, and a giving of credit to a large extent, some of which were 
obviously beyond the reach of compulsory legislation, and, even if they were not, could be best 
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While collusion would protect the railroads from ruinous competition, 
it would not protect customers, however. A railroad cartel would charge 
its profit-maximizing price just as a single firm monopolist would, not 
the minimum price needed to sustain investment in the industry. In the 
1880s, Gilded Age scholars of railway regulation such as eventual Yale 
president Arthur Twining Hadley embarked on a serious economic and 
legal analysis of railroad costs and pricing.127 Already by this time, 
railroad operators and economists understood that paying off fixed cost 
debt required keeping output high, and that this would be facilitated by 
permitting price discrimination.128 Hadley showed how adding 
incremental freight at reduced rates served to lower overall costs, 
provided that the rate was greater than incremental operating costs.129
Hadley was already closing in on a fundamental conception of mid-
twentieth century rate regulation130: Absent capacity constraints, the 
optimal rate should bring in every class of customers at the highest rate 
that class is willing to pay, thus maximizing output. But of course, that 
was price discrimination, which could be trusted to produce loud 
complaints from those required to pay the higher prices.
The need to price discriminate in order to sustain high output led to 
rate classification rules that seemed unnecessarily complicated and 
fundamentally unfair to outside observers,131 although their purpose was 
clear: Any freight rate sufficient to cover the variable costs of shipment 
would make a positive contribution to net revenue. By bringing in every 
such customer at the highest price they were willing to pay, the railroad 
maximized its revenue and could divide its fixed costs over a larger 
number of sales. Offsetting this, of course, would be the administrative 
cost of developing so many classifications, including disputing 
classification costs with unhappy customers or their rivals.132 These 
solutions, extended to other public utilities, produced much of the modern 
                                                                                                                     
settled, and all the incidents and qualifications fixed, by the voluntary action of the parties in 
control of the roads respectively.” (quoting 1 I.C.C. ANN. REP. 1, 33 (1887)).
127. See generally, e.g., ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS 
HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1885).
128. Id. at 114–18 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of local price discrimination). 
129. Id. at 117; see also Frank W. Taussig, A Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates,
5 Q.J. ECON. 438, 454–59 (1891) (showing more technically the efficiency of price 
discrimination).
130. See infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text (discussing Ramsey pricing).
131. See Sidney S. Alderman, How Shall the Railroad Rate Structure be Regulated in the 
Public Interest?, 12 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 579, 579 (1947) (considering certain cases and their 
position that rate rules were unfair to certain shippers). 
132. See, e.g., United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 60, 69 (1956) (involving a dispute 
over higher tariffs for napalm-containing bombs); Great N. Ry. v. Merchants’ Elevator Co., 259 
U.S. 285, 288 (1922) (involving a dispute over grain).
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neoclassical economics of regulation, including a more sophisticated 
understanding of second- and third-degree price discrimination. For 
example, the Ramsey pricing solution discussed below contemplated 
very elaborate rate classifications, literally assessing a rate equal to each 
individual customer’s willingness to pay.133
Once marginalism led to classification of costs as fixed, variable, and 
marginal, the basic theory of rate regulation became simple enough. The 
devil was in the details. The regulated utility, transportation, or other firm 
was entitled to a “fair rate of return” on its fixed cost investment, plus 
“pass through” of its variable costs.134 This has come to be called “rate of 
return” regulation or “cost of service” ratemaking.135 It has been widely 
used for a century, but also widely criticized, mainly for providing 
insufficient incentives for firms to innovate or reduce costs.136 It also 
produced a lengthy constitutional debate about the rate base—namely, 
whether the firm’s return should be based on replacement cost of worn 
out plant and equipment, or whether it was enough that the firm receive 
a positive return on its actual historical investment, which was typically
much lower.137 It also depended on a clear delineation between fixed and 
variable costs that was sometimes difficult to maintain in practice.
During the Substantive Due Process era, the Supreme Court had 
insisted on “fair value” and this was generally interpreted by 
contemporaries as replacement cost or even more.138 The Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
133. See infra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
134. Paul M. Sotkiewicz & Lynne Holt, Public Utility Commission Regulation and Cost-
Effectiveness of Title IV: Lessons for CAIR, 18 ELECTRICITY J. 68, 74 (2005). 
135. The standard treatment is attributed to ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 31, 48 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. 2d ed. 1988) (1970–
1971). See also JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 109 (2d ed. 
1988) (describing cost of service ratemaking); CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF 
PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 409–10 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the shift in regulatory 
proceedings towards cost of service rate regulation).
136. See, e.g., Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1052 (1962).
137. The debate also became a focus of the early law and economics movement. See 
generally Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 209 (1922) (arguing for historical cost).
138. See, e.g., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 541 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). The Court indicated that even a rate that 
provided for full recovery of all costs, including interest and a dividend to shareholders, would be 
insufficient if less than fair market value:
It cannot, therefore, be admitted that a railroad corporation maintaining a 
highway under the authority of the State may fix its rates with a view solely to 
its own interests, and ignore the rights of the public. But the rights of the public 
would be ignored if rates for the transportation of persons or property on a 
railroad are exacted without reference to the fair value of the property used for 
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formulation of the requirements in Smyth v. Ames139 was:
[I]n order to ascertain that [fair] value, the original cost of 
construction, the amount expended in permanent 
improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and 
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of 
construction, the probable earning capacity of the property 
under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum 
required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for 
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just 
and right in each case. We do not say that there may not be 
other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the 
property.140
After the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal had relegated 
Substantive Due Process to history, however, the Supreme Court began 
to uphold rates based on historical cost as the constitutional minimum.141
Two of the most serious criticisms of rate of return regulation are,
first, that the basic formulation leads to inefficient pricing to the extent 
that pass through of variable costs is not a sufficiently close 
approximation of marginal cost. Second, the administration of cost-of-
service ratemaking takes away firms’ incentives to innovate and reduce 
costs.142
On the first, cost of service rate making is often not a close 
approximation to marginal cost pricing. A single price equal to marginal 
cost would be far too low for most public utilities because it would not 
compensate the utility for its fixed costs. But how should fixed costs be 
allocated? The Ramsey solution, which was intended to maximize output 
and thus reduce the impact of fixed costs, was to price to each customer 
at the inverse of that customer’s elasticity of demand.143 While Ramsey 
                                                                                                                     
the public or the fair value of the services rendered, but in order simply that the 
corporation may meet operating expenses, pay the interest on its obligations, and 
declare a dividend to stockholders.
Id. at 544.
139. 169 U.S. 466 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of 
Am., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
140. Id. at 546–47.
141. See generally Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 606–07 (1944) 
(approving rate based on historical cost less depreciation); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas 
Pipeline Co. of Am., 315 U.S. 575 (1942) (rejecting argument that the Constitution required rates 
based on anticipated replacement cost).
142. MARK A. JAMISON, PUB. UTIL. RESEARCH CTR., RATE OF RETURN: REGULATION 3
(2005), https://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/centers/purc/docs//papers/0528_Jamison_Rate_of_ Return.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q874-5UT3]. 
143. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Under 
Ramsey pricing, the regulator allows firms to charge each user a premium over marginal cost in 
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formalized this solution in the 1920s and it bears his name, railroads had 
already been doing a crude version of this for decades, as Arthur Twining 
Hadley’s 1885 book on railroad rates had elaborated.144 Regulators 
understood that the key to profitability was to maximize output within the 
capacity of the existing fixed cost network.145 Any shipper willing to pay 
more than running expenses was profitable in the short run.146 At the 
same time, however, someone had to amortize fixed costs. As a result, 
the elaborate railroad rate classification schemes made rates for lower 
value goods such as coal or cement that were far below the rates charged 
for higher value finished goods.147
Railroads also charged significantly higher prices per mile for short 
hauls than for long hauls.148 The rationale for that phenomenon is readily 
apparent to anyone who looks at a map of the American railroad network. 
Often there was only one railroad between two fairly nearby towns. 
However, as the drop and pickup points became further apart the network 
provided more alternatives, making it possible for more railroads to 
compete for the same shipment. That is, the amount of competition in the 
market increased as the distance between the two shipping points 
increased. One effect of this difference is that the federal concern, limited 
to interstate shipments, was largely with rates that were too low.149 By 
contrast, the state concern, limited mainly to intrastate shipments, was 
with rates that were too high.150
One idea intended to make regulated pricing resemble market pricing 
more closely was Ronald Coase’s suggestion of two-part pricing, which 
attempted to segregate the fixed and variable cost components, permitting 
marginal cost pricing of the latter.151 Coase argued that every customer 
                                                                                                                     
inverse proportion to the elasticity of the user’s demand. Because the highest charges fall on the 
most inelastic demanders, the impact on total usage is minimized. Thus, the Commission believed, 
it would reconcile the railroad’s need for revenue to cover total costs with the least possible 
distortion of demand (i.e., railroad usage would approximate as nearly as possible the level that 
would prevail under perfect competition).”). See generally Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to 
the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927) (explaining the Ramsey Solution).
144. See HADLEY, supra note 127, at 118. Hadley defends a railroad’s practice of rate 
discrimination in oyster shipping rates as between two buyers with differential willingness to pay 
by arguing that “[a]t the higher rate the road cannot get sufficient volume of business. At the lower 
rate it cannot get sufficient profit. It must . . . get what it can at high rates, and fill up at the lower 
ones.” Id.
145. See Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 1036–37.
146. See id. at 1037.
147. HADLEY, supra note 127, at 121.
148. Id. at 117.
149. See Hovenkamp, supra note 119, at 1056–62.
150. Id. at 1056.
151. Ronald H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 169, 173 
(1946). For elaboration, see KAHN, supra note 135, at 95–100.
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could be required to pay an access fee which was fixed, in the sense that 
it did not vary with the number of units that the customer used.152 This 
fee would be calculated so as to cover the fixed cost components of public 
utility costs, and Ramsey concerns about maximizing output could be 
included in the computation. Then each customer’s actual use would be 
priced out at marginal cost.
Coase’s article had actually been written as a response to Harold 
Hotelling’s far more interventionist approach, which would require the 
government to pay the fixed cost proportion of transportations and 
utilities by providing the infrastructure, and then charging customers the 
marginal cost of operation.153 Hotelling’s argument was highly praised 
by prominent public utility scholars of the day, such as James 
Bonbright.154 By contrast, Coase, who was always fierce in searching out 
private alternatives, sought one that would minimize government control.
It is worth noting that this debate, which occurred in the 1930s and 1940s, 
reveals how central marginalist conceptions had become in economic 
thinking about regulated pricing—both among those who advocated for 
a high degree of public ownership as well as libertarians such as Coase.
The second development, which was to have a major impact on the 
deregulation movement, was Averch and Johnson’s theory of gold-
plating.155 Economically, the “Averch-Johnson effect” operates as a 
severe qualification on Coase’s The Nature of the Firm156 when the firm 
is in a price-regulated environment. Coase actually conceived of his own 
article as a first attempt to apply marginalist economics to questions about 
the optimal size and shape of a business firm.157 He opened his paper with 
praise for Marshall:
It is hoped to show . . . that a definition of a firm may be 
obtained which is not only realistic . . . but is tractable by 
two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis 
developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of 
substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the 
margin.158
                                                                                                                     
152. See Coase, supra note 151.
153. Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of 
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242, 242, 258–60, 264 (1938).
154. James C. Bonbright, Major Controversies as to the Criteria of Reasonable Public 
Utility Rates, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 385 (1941) (following Hotelling); see also Nancy Ruggles, 
Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing, 17 REV. ECON. STUD. 107, 107–10
(1949) (describing Hotelling’s theory).
155. See Averch & Johnson, supra note 136, at 1068.
156. Coase, supra note 13.
157. Id. at 386.
158. Id. at 386–87. 
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Coase argued that the firm, driven entirely by the need to maximize 
its profits, relentlessly compares the marginal cost of doing something 
internally against the marginal cost of procurement from outside, 
choosing whichever produces the largest payoff.159 As a result, the firm’s 
structure is efficient to the extent that its procurement decisions are 
efficient.160
But suppose the firm is guaranteed a profitable price, equal to or 
slightly above marginal cost, on all of its internal production. The firm 
will have an incentive to perform activities internally rather than through 
purchase on the market, even though the latter is the better choice in a 
competitive market. The firm would have a regulation-imposed incentive 
to integrate vertically or to expand into other markets. For example, to 
the extent that it gets its rate of return on its capital investment and is 
limited to pass through of costs for variable cost items such as labor,161 it
has an incentive to invest relatively more in capital assets. As a result, 
regulated firms tend to be excessively capital intensive when compared 
with the unregulated market.162 Perhaps more ominously, the regulated 
firm would have an incentive to build unneeded infrastructure, knowing 
that it would be guaranteed a profitable rate of return.163 By contrast, a 
competitive firm would enlarge its plant only if anticipated receipts, 
determined entirely by the market, exceeded anticipated costs.
The Averch-Johnson literature produced interesting collateral issues, 
such as the regulated utility’s right to recover for its “stranded” costs, 
which are costs incurred in enlargement of infrastructure that later turned 
out to be unnecessary or unwise. 164 In some cases this happened because 
                                                                                                                     
159. Id. at 406. 
160. For example, monopoly in a supply market might induce a firm to do something 
internally even though external procurement might be cheaper if that market were competitive.
161. Although, regulation will lead to higher wages to the extent that the firm is guaranteed 
pass through of higher wage costs. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose, Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: 
Evidence from the Trucking Industry, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1146, 1146, 1173–75 (1987) (determining 
that deregulation in the trucking industry leads to lower wages).
162. For a simple economic analysis, together with a summary of the most important 
critiques see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT 
AND REGULATION 91–93 (1993) and W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST 433–36 (4th ed. 2005). For deep skepticism see Stephen M. Law, Assessing the 
Averch-Johnson-Wellisz Effect for Regulated Utilities, 6 INT’L J. ECON. & FIN. 41, 51–52 (2014).
For more technical treatment in the context of natural monopolies see generally Paul L. Joskow, 
Regulation of Natural Monopolies, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
163. See KAHN, supra note 135, at 35–36.
164. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains,
108 YALE L.J. 801, 831 (1999) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION 
OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997)).
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of policy changes that made previous investments improvident, such as 
coal-fired plants or hospitals’ certificates of need.165 Firms acting under 
regulation often propose capital investments to a regulator, and Averch-
Johnson suggests this can happen even if those investments would have 
been inefficient in a competitive market. Then later, when the regulator 
views things differently or the increased demand that the regulated utility 
promised does not materialize, the regulator withdraws its authorization. 
This might leave a partially built or recently on line plant “stranded,” in 
the sense that it is no longer needed or demand is insufficient. The firm 
may then claim that the regulatory approval and its subsequent retraction 
is an improper taking of its property without compensation.166
No matter how one feels about Averch-Johnson, one thing that 
emerges clearly is that cost-of-service rate making is not the best way to 
determine price and output in any market where competition is available 
as a workable alternative. As a result, price regulated markets must be 
pared down so that price and output is regulated only in those portions of 
the market where competition seems not to work. This has been one of 
the principal consequences of the deregulation movement discussed 
below.167
III. THE CHANGING DOMAIN OF MARKET FAILURE: TRADITIONAL 
REGULATION, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND PIGOUVIAN TAXES
The marginalist revolution led United States policy to the “mixed” 
economy that it has today.168 Under marginalism, markets appear less
robust than pre-marginalists believed, but they remain the dominant 
means by which resources move around. The most important economic 
policy function of government today is identifying markets that work well 
when left relatively untended and those that require intervention, and then 
determining the correct prescription for the latter group.
                                                                                                                     
165. See generally Michael E. Granfield, Resource Allocation Within Hospitals: An
Unambiguous Analytical Test of the A-J Hypothesis, 7 J. APPLIED ECON. 241 (1975) (explaining 
the application of the A-J hypothesis in a hospital setting).
166. See Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 
BROOK. L. REV. 645, 650–59, 691 (2017) (discussing stranded costs in the context of attempts to 
migrate power generation away from carbon-based fuels). See generally J. GREGORY SIDAK &
DANIEL F. SPULBUR, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE 
COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES xiii (1997)
(addressing “deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property,” 
or “deregulatory takings”). 
167. See discussion infra Part V.
168. For a robust defense, see generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN 
AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER
(2016) (discussing the “mixed” economy and the prosperity it has created in America).
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This makes the concept of “market failure” central to modern public 
decision making. In the political economy of regulation, the term has 
more than a single meaning. The dominant definition within neoclassical 
economics relates to the inability of a market to reach an equilibrium on 
its own,169 or otherwise to reach only equilibria that exhibit unsatisfactory 
output and prices.170 As an example of the latter, when entry is 
impossible, monopoly may be a stable equilibrium, but one in which price 
and output are suboptimal. Another example is externalities that cause 
harm in secondary markets. Internally, the primary market might attain 
an equilibrium, and perhaps even at competitive prices. However, that 
market might impose unnecessarily heavy costs elsewhere, indicating 
that these prices are not covering the full social cost of the activity. The 
debate over so-called Pigouvian taxes, which has waxed and waned and 
waxed again over nearly a century, principally concerns mechanisms for 
reducing or eliminating these externalities by taxing the harmful conduct, 
and in some cases using the funds to correct harms elsewhere.171
Under the strictest definition, static market failure is any durable 
deviation from marginal cost pricing. Of course, dynamic factors such as 
innovation may simultaneously increase the innovator’s price-cost 
margins while also increasing output or welfare, at least in the long run.172
For example, one of the longest-standing responses to market failure is 
the intellectual property system, which involves government creation of 
exclusive rights to facilitate limited periods of high price-cost margins as 
an inducement to innovation. In any event, market failure is often defined 
in ways that do not use Pareto efficiency or perfect competition as a 
baseline—for example, one can speak of it as “the failure of the market 
to bring about results that are in the best interests of society as a 
                                                                                                                     
169. See generally LESTER TELSER, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE CORE (1978) (outlining the 
core theory in economics and the effect on market equilibrium); see generally, e.g., Stephen Craig 
Pirrong, An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets, 35 J.L. &
ECON. 89 (1992) (applying core theory to ocean shipping markets); Timothy K. Smith & Ronald 
B. Lieber, Why Air Travel Doesn’t Work, FORTUNE, Apr. 3, 1995, at 42 (discussing core theory in 
the context of airlines).
170. The standard discussion is Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J.
ECON. 351 (1958). See also Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 387, 387–89 (1954) (attempting to assign a strict definition to market failure). For 
even further commentary, see generally PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL 
EXAMINATION (Tyler Cowen ed., 2017).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 208–18.
172. See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, Thinking About Technology Policy: “Market Failures” 
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whole,”173 or as the failure of market institutions “to sustain ‘desirable’ 
activities or to estop ‘undesirable’ activities.”174
Technical neoclassical definitions of market failure generally exclude 
purely distributive factors. Of course, sometimes income inequality can 
lead to market failure, particularly when inequality makes it more costly 
for people without resources to move into more productive 
occupations,175 or when lack of competitive pressure on certain groups 
induces them to be less productive.176 To the extent maldistribution of 
wealth impairs productivity, and thus output, it can be a market failure 
even under a strictly neoclassical definition.
The classical political economists had strong faith in markets. To be 
sure, there were important qualifications, such as Thomas Malthus’
population argument that in the long run the market would force the 
population to subsistence levels,177 Ricardo’s concerns with monopoly in 
land rents,178 or John Stuart Mill’s discussion of natural monopoly and 
the British postal system or lines for gas lighting.179 But for the most part 
the classical political economists regarded these as rare exceptions to the 
general theory of markets. That was even truer of classical political 
economy in the United States, where an abundance of undeveloped land 
was widely seen as making the concerns expressed by both Malthus and
Ricardo relatively unimportant.180 Increasingly after the Jackson era, 
American legislatures and courts trusted markets to allocate resources 
                                                                                                                     
173. Alain Marciano & Steven G. Medema, Market Failure in Context: Introduction, 47 
HIST. POL. ECON. 1, 1 (2015).
174. Bator, supra note 170, at 351. Vaguely, Bator adds that the meaning of “desirable” is 
determined by the solution to “some explicit or implied maximum-welfare problem.” Id.
175. See generally, e.g., Kim A. Weeden & David B. Grusky, Inequality and Market Failure,
38 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 473 (2014) (discussing market failure as a result of income inequality 
and occupational, educational, managerial, and capital “rents”).
176. For example, if it could be shown that a tax and transfer system that levelled income 
also increased productivity, then this would be a correction of a market failure in the neoclassical 
sense.
177. See generally THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (1798)
(discussing population’s effect on markets).
178. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 49–76
(1817) (describing the nature of land rents and the interplay between rent and commodities).
179. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF 
THEIR APPLICATION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (1848) (discussing the concept of natural monopoly).
180. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 379, 421–31 (1988) (summarizing how nineteenth century American political economists 
believed that the vast amounts of undeveloped land in the United States established that the threats 
offered by Malthus and Ricardo would occur in the distant future, if at all).
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properly. Some states even invalidated monopoly rights for rather clear 
natural monopoly industries, such as gas lighting.181
A common characteristic of the bridges, toll roads, canals, and 
railroads that received monopoly charters prior to the Civil War is that 
they required a significant fixed cost investment, and in most cases a 
single installation could handle all of the traffic.182 As a result, they were 
true natural monopolies. Competition would drive prices to marginal cost 
without enough remaining to cover fixed costs. Indeed, in the Charles
River Bridge case the plaintiffs raised the “ruinous competition” defense 
sixty years before it came into use in railroad cases.183 Tolls decreased by 
half to two-thirds upon the opening of the competing Warren Bridge.184
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court the Charles River Bridge 
had already closed.185 It would reopen in 1841, only when the 
Commonwealth turned it into a free bridge.186
At least for a time, the marginalist revolution very largely brought the
classicists’ robust faith in markets to an end—a view undoubtedly aided 
by World War I and the Depression. The concerns about fixed costs and 
failure of equilibrium discussed previously187 were one significant 
manifestation, but there were others. The dramatic rise of antitrust was 
driven by the belief that even markets that are not natural monopolies can 
fail. Indeed, the extent to which antitrust was brought to bear in 
nonmonopolized markets is striking. After the New Deal, Antitrust 
became a vehicle for controlling manufacturer-created distribution 
systems in competitively structured markets,188 as well as controlling 
                                                                                                                     
181. See, e.g., Norwich GasLight Co. v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19, 37–38 (1856) 
(invalidating monopoly grants for a gas light utility granted by both the state and the local 
government and permitting second firm to install competing lines).
182. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, 105–68, 199–206 (discussing fixed costs and market 
failure history).
183. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 436 (1837) (“No other 
ferry or bridge could be erected . . . without being so near, in the language of Blackstone, as to 
draw away the custom of the elder ferry or bridge; or without producing, in the language of 
Chancellor Kent, ruinous competition.”). On the railroads and ruinous competition, see discussion 
supra notes 112–26.
184. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 349, 538 (1829).
185. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 112.
186. See KUTLER, supra note 95, at 32–45.
187. See discussion supra Part I.
188. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 206–39. See generally LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER,
AMERICAN FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE “NEW COMPETITION,”
1890–1940 (2018) (exploring the development of antimonopoly law and economics, including 
antitrust law, in the wake of the New Deal).
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price differences among competing dealers,189 and for limiting the effects 
of product differentiation. Underlying this was a fear of vertical 
integration that, at least as a matter of economics, can only be described 
as hysterical.190
Increasingly after the mid-twentieth century, regulatory theory 
embraced a renewed neoclassicism that once again saw markets as robust, 
although perhaps not as robust as they were perceived by the classicists.
Coasean thinking strongly emphasized market solutions, even in markets 
that did not meet the requirements for perfect competition. Indeed, the 
Coase Theorem itself focused on bargaining in bilateral monopolies.191
Entitlements such as exclusive rights in communications spectrum192 or 
the right to pollute became tradeable and the scope of market failure 
declined to near non-existence. In the Coasean vision, even the 
lighthouse, frequently given as an example of resistance to market supply, 
became freed from government control.193
Worse yet, with the rise of modern public choice theory in the 1960s, 
interest group capture, rather than market failure, became the dominant 
positive rationale for regulation.194 Writers like Buchanan and Tullock 
began with perfect competition as the baseline, and then sought to explain 
how democratic political voting produced harmful deviations.195 Mancur 
Olson’s much more popular but equally devastating Logic of Collective 
Action also began with competitive markets as a baseline and then tried 
to explain regulatory deviations as political oligopolies or cartels that 
                                                                                                                     
189. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 220–39 (discussing the effects of the passage of the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(2012))).
190. See id. at 206–19.
191. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
633, 640–41 (2009). See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1960) (explaining that in a world without transaction costs, people would negotiate with each 
other to produce the most mutually beneficial outcomes, focusing heavily on bilateral 
monopolies). 
192. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1, 25 (1959).
193. See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 376 (1974) 
(disputing economists’ use of the lighthouse as an example of a service that the government must 
provide rather than the private market).
194. See generally NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A
HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY (Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994) 
(exploring the history of market regulation and focusing on the influence of interest groups on the 
development of governmental policies).
195. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965) (discussing the behavior of an 
individual as he participates in the democratic process, analogizing constitutional choice with the 
theory of private choice in economics).
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enriched their organizers at the expense of society.196 Ironically, Olson 
borrowed his regulatory oligopoly theory straight from left leaning 
Edward Chamberlin, who had been his dissertation director.197 Under the 
theory, small relatively homogeneous groups of individuals or firms with 
a common cause could wield disproportionate political power over larger 
but less unified or focused interest groups that represented the larger part
of society.198 Under the Stigler-Posner-Peltzman model of regulation, its 
roots lay in political bargaining among special interests rather than 
neoclassical price theory or industrial organization economics.199
Theories of interest group capture actually entered American political-
economic discourse from the left, through writers such as Charles Beard 
and Gabriel Kolko. Beard argued during the Progressive Era that the 
Constitution was largely a product of capture by urban owners of personal 
property over much more populous but widely dispersed agrarian 
interests.200 Kolko, a New Left disciple of Herbert Marcuse, argued in the 
1960s that Gilded Age railroad regulation really occurred at the behest of 
the railroads themselves, who wanted regulation in order to shelter 
themselves from competition.201 After that, regulatory capture theory 
moved rightward.202
Today we seem to have reached a balance in regulatory theory in 
which a combination of traditional price and organization economics and 
public choice theory are called upon as the best positive explainers of 
regulatory policy. In a democratic society, to see regulation as nothing 
more than the consequence of market structure or cost characteristics is 
naïve, but so is seeing it as nothing more than the outcome of fights
among competing interest groups. For example, today in the great 
majority of states groceries, clothing, and automobiles are sold in markets 
that are more-or-less competitive, with prices set predominantly through 
                                                                                                                     
196. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 133–67 (1965).
197. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 313 n.72.
198. Id. at 313–14. 
199. Sam Peltzman, An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in 
the Twentieth Century, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 656, 656, 674 (1985); Sam Peltzman, The Economic 
Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 1; Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 22, 31 (1971); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 
J. POL. ECON. 807, 819 (1975); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3, 7 (1971).
200. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 73–151 (1913).
201. See generally GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877–1916 (1965)
(discussing railroad regulation).
202. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 308–14.
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voluntary transactions. By contrast, retail electricity and natural gas are 
sold at retail through regulated monopolies. Few would seriously argue 
that this is because electric power lobbyists have more clout than those 
who work in the food and agricultural markets.
To be sure, interest group theory may explain many of the details of 
regulatory policy. As noted below, the deregulation movement has done 
a great service by distinguishing those attributes of the economy that are 
best left to the market from those that require more active state 
intervention.203 In the process, however, the deregulation movement 
faces abundant criticism from those who think it has gone too far on the 
one side, and those who think that it has not gone far enough on the other.
The history of “Pigouvian” taxes as a corrective for market failure
long precedes both Pigou and the marginalist revolution. In 1776, Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations proposed a tax on carriages to offset the 
damage they do to roads. He suggested that the tax be proportional to 
weight because “each carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the wear 
and tear which that carriage occasions of the roads.”204 In the United 
States, taxes rather than prohibitions were frequently used by the mid-
nineteenth century to control liquor consumption, lotteries, gambling and 
other vices.205 Reflecting on these, in 1876 Thomas M. Cooley included 
a chapter in his Treatise on Taxation on “Taxes under the Power of 
Police.”206 Such a tax does not have “for its object the raising of revenue,” 
but rather “the conservation of order . . . , to the encouragement of 
industry, and the discouragement of pernicious employments.”207
A half century later Arthur C. Pigou, successor to Marshall’s 
professorship at Cambridge, devoted a chapter of his Study in Public 
Finance to “Taxes and Bounties to Correct Maladjustments.”208 These 
maladjustments were situations in which “the value of the marginal social 
net product falls short of the value of the marginal private net product 
when resources yield, besides the commodity which is sold and paid for, 
a dis-commodity for which those on whom it is inflicted are unable to 
                                                                                                                     
203. See discussion infra Part V.
204. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
338 (2d ed. 1778) (1776).
205. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 13 Ark. 752, 752 (1853) (tax on billiard parlors);
Wendover v. City of Lexington, 15 B. Mon. 258, 262, 264 (Ky. App. 1854) (lottery tax);
Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 413 (1875) (liquor); City of Hannibal v. Guyott, 18 Mo. 
515, 516 (1853) (same); J.F. Baker & Co. v. Panola Cty., 30 Tex. 86, 87 (1867) (same). For a 
fuller discussion, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 104–05.
206. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION, INCLUDING THE LAW OF 
LOCAL ASSESSMENTS 396–415 (1876).
207. Id. at 396.
208. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE, Ch. 8 (2d Ed. 1929) (1928).
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exact compensation.”209 The theory behind Pigouvian taxes was that the 
tax would impose a cost that would correct harmful externalities by 
making the harm causing activity less profitable, and thus reducing it to 
a safer point.210 Meanwhile, the tax monies could be used to correct the 
harms.211 The trick is to increase the marginal cost of the harmful activity 
to the point that its marginal cost equals its marginal social benefit.212
Pigou’s views were aggressively criticized by Ronald Coase, who 
argued in The Problem of Social Cost that the problem of divergences 
between “private” and “social” net product is really one of identifying 
who is hurting whom.213 Further, Coase argued, private bargaining will 
address such situations, provided that transaction costs are sufficiently 
low.214 The burdened and benefitted sides would bargain their way to an 
efficient result that would eliminate non-cost-justified harms. On the 
other hand, if a harm was cost justified the person imposing it would pay 
for it rather than stop.215 The Problem of Social Cost was in large part an 
assault on Pigou.216
Today Pigouvian taxation has experienced a revival in the academic 
literature, if not yet in policy.217 The principal targets are carbon fuels and 
other emissions whose victims are not in a position to bargain with those 
who injure them.218 That is to say, it is not so much that Coase was wrong 
                                                                                                                     
209. Id. at 119. He observed: “Thus, incidental uncharged disservices are rendered to third 
parties when the owner of a site in the residential quarter of a city builds a factory there and so 
destroys a great part of the amenities of neighbouring sites . . . .” Id.
210. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U. PA. L. REV.
93, 100 (2015).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 100–01.
213. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960).
214. Id. at 15–18.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 28–29. Coase’s critique was in turn severely criticized in A.W. Brian Simpson, 
Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 53–97 (1996).
217. Masur & Posner, supra note 210, at 100–01; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 3–4
(2002) (discussing Pigouvian taxation); N. Gregory Mankiw, Smart Taxes: An Open Invitation to 
Join the Pigou Club, 35 E. ECON. J. 14, 14–15 (2009) (discussing the disagreement among 
economists on Pigouvian taxation); Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as a 
Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, 54 J.L. & ECON. S249, S249–50 (2011) 
(discussing the limited application of Pigouvian taxation). One optimistic evaluation is CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT ix (2002). For a more 
pessimistic assessment of policy results so far, see Robert W. Hahn & Robert A. Ritz, Does the 
Social Cost of Carbon Matter? Evidence from U.S. Policy, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 232 (2015).
218. E.g., Evan N. Turgeon, Triple-Dividends: Toward Pigovian Gasoline Taxation, 30 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 145, 146–49 (2010). On the metrics, see generally Shi-Ling Hsu, 
A Complete Analysis of Carbon Taxation: Considering the Revenue Side, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 857 
(2017).
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about the proposition that private bargaining could be a corrective if 
transaction costs were sufficiently low. Rather, it is that the presence of 
high transaction costs is in fact ubiquitous, and makes his observations 
irrelevant over a wide range of circumstances.
IV. MARKET DIVERSITY AND AGENCY SECTOR REGULATION
Market failure and market diversity go hand in hand. Markets are like 
Tolstoy’s families. Happy families are all pretty much alike, but each 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.219 When markets work well 
they require relatively little government attention other than the rules of 
property and contract, supervised by courts of general jurisdiction. But 
markets fail for reasons that are typically quite specific to each one. Even 
natural monopolies, while exhibiting a common set of characteristics, 
have unique features and information requirements that operate on the 
regulator.
An important consequence of the marginalist revolution was this idea 
that markets differ from one another, particularly when they fail. For a 
variety of reasons, they were thought to require different regulatory fixes.
First, the cost classifications that occupied marginalists, including the 
emergent theory of regulated monopoly, not only made price and output 
analysis more complex, they also revealed that while firms within the 
same market and using the same technology might be similar, the firms 
in one market could have cost structures that were quite different from 
those in another market. Further, the relationship between fixed costs and 
market size varied enormously. A relatively small railroad operating 
within a single state might require price regulation, while giant petroleum 
or steel refiners might be made to operate competitively. Geographically 
large markets tend to require larger regulators—most notably the federal 
government if they spilled over more than a single state. Small markets 
were best controlled by smaller regulators—namely, states and 
municipalities. The diversity was not merely geographic, however. It was 
also production or technology specific. For example, the cost 
classification problems that might show up in electric power generation 
differed from those for natural gas production or telecommunications. 
Agencies at all levels of government with unique and exclusive 
jurisdictions were in large part a response to this perception of market 
diversity, replacing a nineteenth century conception in which most 
“regulating” was carried on by courts of general jurisdiction.
George Stigler once considered how economists from Adam Smith 
through Frank Knight, working over a century and a half, attempted to 
                                                                                                                     
219. See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Joel Carmichael trans., Bantam Books 1960)
(1877) (“Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”). Thanks 
to Suzanna Sherry for this.
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identify the prerequisites for perfect competition. He concluded such a 
list is impossible because the complete theory is “open ended”:
[I]t is always possible that a new range of problems will be 
posed in this framework, and then, no matter how well 
developed the theory was with respect to the earlier range of 
problems, it may require extensive elaboration in respects 
which previously it glossed over or ignored.220
What Stigler was able to harvest from these writers was three families 
of characteristics, each of which exhibited wide variations. The first is 
structural, pertaining to the number of actors in a market and the nature 
of their costs. Second is the ability of individual actors to make 
maximizing choices without excessive restraint. Third is the free flow of 
reliable, actionable information. Oddly, Stigler never mentioned 
externalities, or the inability of bargaining parties to internalize all the 
effects of their transactions. This is peculiar, because contemporaries 
such as Pigou and Coase were virtually obsessed with them. Paul Bator’s 
contemporary essay on market failure also commented on them at 
length,221 and they have become a central concern in such as areas as 
environmental regulation. Perhaps for this reason, Stigler’s essay makes 
no mention of patents or other intellectual property rights. If anything, 
Stigler understated the varieties of market failure.
Market diversity and complexity invariably led to market-specific 
expertise and the rise of sector-specific regulatory agencies. While 
accountability in adjudication and rule making are big issues, the most 
fundamental conflict over the legitimacy of agency regulation concerns
the extent and diversity of market failure. The Constitution was drafted 
long prior to the marginalist revolution and its increasing appreciation of 
market diversity. Within the framework acknowledged by the 
Constitution the principal regulators of the economy were Congress and 
the state and federal Courts. Even the IP Clause, which authorized the 
Patent Act,222 did not expressly authorize the creation of an agency 
similar to the USPTO. Rather, it empowered Congress to “secur[e] for 
limited Times . . . the exclusive Right.”223 That language is more 
consistent with direct Congressional issuance of patents, just as state 
issued patents prior to the Constitution were typically issued directly by 
                                                                                                                     
220. George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 
14 (1957).
221. Bator, supra note 170, at 371–75.
222. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 & cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
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state legislatures.224 At the same time, however, the Framers had the 
foresight not to prohibit the creation and use of an intermediary such as 
an agency.
As discussed later, another problem leading to agency regulation was 
risk management.225 Once again, however, the nature and technical 
features of the relevant risks could vary widely from one technology or 
product to another. Classical valuations that depended on the past did not 
take risk into account because relevant risks were already encountered 
and included in the calculus. But risk became a significant, even
overwhelming, part of valuation and optimization within the more 
forward looking marginalist framework. This is particularly true of 
activities that produce numerous situations where the market itself or the 
common law cannot force people to internalize the social harm their 
activities cause.
V. DEREGULATION
The deregulation movement forced reexamination of many issues in 
the debate over the economic rationales for government intervention. The 
movement began in government policy during the waning years of the 
Carter administration and accelerated during the 1980s.226 The initial 
impact of deregulation was substantial. By one measure, industries 
characterized by “full” regulation of price and entry produced about 17%
of the GNP in 1977, but about 6.6% in 1988.227 The deregulation 
movement was significantly a reaction to excesses in the granting of 
monopoly status (entry restrictions) and needless price regulation. Then-
Professor Stephen Breyer’s 1984 book, Regulation and its Reform,
pointed out how legal entry restrictions and price regulation were 
imposed in industries such as trucking that were competitively structured 
or at least capable of being so.228 Breyer termed these instances of 
“regulatory mismatch.”229
                                                                                                                     
224. See P.J. Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 167–69 (1931); Hovenkamp, 
supra note 89, at 267–68.
225. See discussion infra Part VIII.
226. See, e.g., Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (removing entry restrictions and most rate regulation, 
except for the obligation to file a rate). A later regulation removed most obligations to file rates. 
See 49 U.S.C. § 13710 (2012). Rail rates were also largely deregulated. See, e.g., id. § 10502(a).
227. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 305 (3d ed. 
2000).
228. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 222–39 (1982).
229. See id. at 247–48.
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In addition, deregulation was a response to several market 
developments. An important one was changes in technology.230 For 
example, thanks to the development of wireless transmission and 
advanced switching capabilities, the technical justifications for a single 
natural monopoly telephone system disappeared. The real instigators 
were wireless firms such as MCI and Sprint, who convinced courts and 
the FCC to upset AT&T’s strenuously defended resistance to 
interconnection.231
More generally, it became clear that regulation could be a very costly 
enterprise in relation to any benefits that it produced. One well known 
early example of this critique is the evolution of James Landis, Chairman 
of the SEC during the New Deal. Landis initially lauded regulation as the 
savior of the economy,232 but a generation later lamented that it had not 
come close to satisfying expectations.233
However, most of the low hanging fruit has already been picked. 
Further deregulation may threaten the environmental, health, or safety by 
amounts considerably greater than the cost savings themselves, 
depending on the industry.234 That is more likely to be the case as a 
greater amount of regulation is made subject to mandatory cost-benefit 
analysis, and as the methodologies of CBA have improved.235 If a 
regulation was fully and accurately evaluated and approved under CBA, 
then removing it by implication will cause more harm than good.
Contestability theory, which was widely touted as opening the path 
toward broad deregulation,236 has actually had much less to do with 
implementing deregulation than have more fundamental concerns about 
the values of incumbent competition and the economic inefficiency of 
regulation, particularly those expressed in the Averch-Johnson 
literature.237 When deregulation has moved markets from regulated 
monopoly to some sort of competition, the competition that emerged has 
for the most part been among incumbent firms, not monopoly incumbents 
                                                                                                                     
230. See IA PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 241b1 (4th ed. 2013).
231. See generally, e.g., MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1981)
(applying antitrust’s essential facility doctrine to force AT&T to permit wireless carrier to connect 
into its system), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); In re Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
232. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
233. See JAMES M. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
83–86 (1960) (proposing extensive reorganization plans); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 308–09.
234. See Ed Dolan, Is Overregulation Really Holding Back the U.S. Economy, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/is-overregulation-really-holding-back-the-u-s-
economy [https://perma.cc/7D4B-222R].
235. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 264–81.
236. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 226–34.
237. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 164–67.
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who vied with one another for the right to occupy an exclusive position. 
In other words, the Williamson analysis of contestability, emphasizing 
the difficulties in the presence of costly and durable infrastructure, has 
been much more influential on actual policy than the Demsetz analysis.238
The greatest focus of deregulation has been on situations where 
competition among actual incumbents is possible and markets or political 
institutions can be designed in a way that will accommodate them. The 
earliest targets for deregulation, which included trucking and passenger 
airlines, certainly fell into that category. More networked industries 
eventually followed. For example, the dramatic increases in the amount 
of telecommunications competition since the 1982 antitrust consent 
decree breaking up the phone company239 and the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996240 have largely been increases in competition among multiple 
incumbent firms. Contestability theory has not had a significant role. 
AT&T’s divestiture of Western Electric241 led to a fiercely competitive 
market for devices among incumbent rivals, which exists to this day. For 
a lengthy period local telephony operated as a price-regulated monopoly, 
while long distance provision was competitively structured.242 Today 
even local service is competitive, although the competition is typically 
between the resident ILEC,243 wireless, and one or more cable or other 
internet service providers that sell VOIP244 or perhaps a different 
technology. Looking at the economy as a whole, true contestability, 
where a single firm is the current seller in a market with significant 
infrastructure but must periodically re-bid for that right, is a rarity.
The other thing that has accompanied deregulation is a 
counterbalancing increase in the use of antitrust law.245 Under the 
comprehensive regulation formerly thought to govern industries such as 
the airlines, market wide antitrust immunity was often the rule.246 That is 
hardly the case today. Substantially, this is the result of a paradigm shift 
                                                                                                                     
238. See supra text accompanying notes 64–76. For the Demsetz analysis, see generally
Demsetz, supra note 70. For the Williamson analysis, see generally Williamson, supra note 71.
239. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 222–25 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
240. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
47 U.S.C.).
241. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 604 F. Supp. 256, 261 n.23 (D.D.C. 1984), cert. 
denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987).
242. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 414–16 (1999).
243. Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier, or the firm designated as the incumbent carrier in 
a given region. 
244. Voice Over Internet Protocol, which permits real time voice transmission on the 
internet.
245. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 230, ¶ 241.
246. E.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 380 (1973); Pan 
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 305, 309 (1963).
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in the theory of regulation, away from the control of markets and toward 
the control of practices. In most cases of deregulation, regulators do not 
simply exit from a market. Rather, they apply regulatory tools more 
selectively.
During the 1960s we tended to think of federal agency regulation as 
“pervasive,” in the sense that it left little discretion over pricing and 
exclusionary practices to the individual firm, and when these occurred 
they were usually placed within the jurisdiction of the regulatory 
agency.247 Today, however, we view regulation as more “transactional,” 
in that it applies to a particular practice rather than an entire industry. 
When a specific transaction is within the jurisdiction of the agency and 
the agency is actually overseeing it, then antitrust has no role to play. But 
antitrust can be brought to bear in those areas that regulators do not 
tend.248 This hybrid approach is particularly descriptive of 
telecommunications, the airlines, healthcare, and to a lesser extent 
energy.249
VI. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION
The issues swirling around regulation and wealth distribution tend to 
focus on two concerns. The first is whether government control should 
be used to redistribute wealth for its own sake, simply because we regard 
certain distributions as unfair or we think social welfare is greater by 
some measure as wealth is more evenly distributed. The other is whether 
maldistribution of wealth affects productivity, and thus redistribution 
may spur economic growth. The latter one falls within modern 
neoclassical concerns about regulation. Under most conceptions of 
economic welfare, the former one does not.
For the first two generations of marginalists, concerns about the 
distribution of wealth in the economy were paramount. Further, since 
most did not expect that maldistribution of wealth would right itself 
                                                                                                                     
247. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 230, ¶ 240c1.
248. See, e.g., Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 389
(1981).
[W]here Congress did intend to repeal the antitrust laws, that intent governs, but 
this intent must be clear. Even when an industry is regulated substantially, this 
does not necessarily evidence an intent to repeal the antitrust laws with respect 
to every action taken within the industry. Intent to repeal the antitrust laws is 
much clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or 
require the type of conduct under antitrust challenge.
Id. (citations omitted).
249. See, e.g., Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015) (holding Natural 
Gas Act did not preempt application of state antitrust law to claim of anticompetitive price 
manipulation).
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through ordinary market forces, some kind of government intervention 
was thought necessary.
The early marginalists believed in declining marginal utility, but also 
in the policy value of interpersonal utility comparisons. All things equal, 
a more even distribution of wealth produced greater welfare. Individuals 
were thought to experience declining marginal utility for any good, 
including wealth, as they have more. The leap the early marginalists were 
willing to make was that this attribute applied across persons as well as 
to a single individual. For example, Marshall wrote in the third edition of 
Principles that “a pound’s worth of satisfaction to an ordinary poor man 
is a much greater thing than a pound’s worth of satisfaction to an ordinary 
rich man.”250 Marshall’s successor at Cambridge, Arthur C. Pigou, 
agreed: a “transference of income from a relatively rich man to a 
relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense 
wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase 
the aggregate sum of satisfaction.”251 Many early American marginalists 
also agreed. Chicago economist Jacob Viner embraced the most 
significant consequence of interpersonal utility comparisons in 1925—
namely, that “[c]hanges in the relative distribution of income as between 
different classes will bring about changes in the amount of welfare, even 
though the aggregate real income of the community remains the same.”252
Within this framework, a social welfare scheme that transferred wealth 
away from the wealthy and toward the poor increased aggregate welfare 
to the extent that the wealthy experienced less welfare from a given sum 
of money than the poor did.
In the mid-thirties Lord Lionel Robbins exploded this argument in his 
Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science. He argued 
that the proposition that one person experiences the same utility as 
another from a given amount of wealth was scientifically meaningless 
because it could not be tested.253 In a widely quoted passage Robbins 
reasoned:
[S]uppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived by 
A from an income of £1,000, and the satisfaction derived by 
B from an income of twice that magnitude. Asking them 
                                                                                                                     
250. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 206 (3d ed. 1895).
251. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 89 (4th ed. 1938).
252. Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in Value Theory and Its Critics, 33 J. POL. ECON. 368,
644 (1925); see also FRANK WILLIAM TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 132 (3d ed. 1921) 
(“[I]nequality of incomes brings a less sum of human well-being than equality of incomes . . . .”); 
John Bates Clark, The Ultimate Standard of Value, 1 YALE REV. 258, 258 (1893) (discussing the 
social nature of value); Simon N. Patten, The Scope of Political Economy, 2 YALE REV. 264, 265 
(1894) (similar).
253. See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC 
SCIENCE 136–43 (2d ed. 1935); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 111–12.
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would provide no solution. Supposing they differed. A might 
urge that he had more satisfaction than B at the margin. 
While B might urge that, on the contrary, he had more 
satisfaction than A. We do not need to be slavish 
behaviourists to realise that here is no scientific evidence. 
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A’s
satisfaction as compared with B’s. If we tested the state of 
their blood-streams, that would be a test of blood, not 
satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to discover 
what is going on in B’s mind, nor B to discover what is going 
on in A’s. There is no way of comparing the satisfactions of 
different people.254
Given his assumptions, everything that Robbins said in this passage is 
very likely true. Nevertheless, it did not end the debate over interpersonal 
utility comparisons. First, Robbins was writing in a positivistic tradition 
obsessed with limitations on scientific inquiry into state of mind.255 He 
simply assumed that the only “scientific” economic inquiry into welfare 
accordingly concerned mental state.256 For behaviorists and other social 
scientists less prone to recognize a hard mind-body dichotomy, these 
arguments were not persuasive.257 If welfare for policy purposes is 
estimated objectively, by looking at such external factors as material 
wealth, health, education, nutrition, shelter, productivity, or numerous 
other external indicia, then interpersonal comparability is readily 
possible. As a matter of government policy, objective welfare judgments 
may be superior in any event because they more readily permit 
generalization about large numbers.258
Second, Robbins’s analysis disregarded the relationship between 
wealth and human production functions.259 If a transfer from a rich person 
to a poor person also increases productivity by taking wealth from a 
person for whom it has little marginal impact and giving it to someone 
who becomes much more productive, then the transfer may increase 
welfare by increasing economic growth. This makes the transfer welfare 
positive even on traditional neoclassical assumptions that avoid 
interpersonal utility comparisons.
One effect of the welfarism debate was that for some time it created a 
sharp divide between neoclassical welfare economics and more applied 
                                                                                                                     
254. ROBBINS, supra note 253, at 139–40 (emphasis omitted).
255. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 111–12.
256. Id. at 112.
257. See Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare 
Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LITERATURE 507, 523 (1984); Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 521–25.
258. For a more-or-less contemporary critic on this point, see generally I.M.D. LITTLE, A
CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1950).
259. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 112.
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branches of economics, including state economic policy making. The 
same issue also divided neoclassical welfare economics from most of the 
other social sciences.260 In neoclassical economics textbooks, authors 
talked about “mere” wealth transfers as if economics should be 
indifferent to them. The real concern of economics was said to be 
allocative efficiency, typically measured by Paretian criteria, and the 
deadweight loss caused by monopoly. By contrast, economic policy 
during the New Deal and after took the distribution of wealth very 
seriously and developed important governmental programs designed to 
give effect to these concerns.261 Even in public utility law, the goal of 
universal service for such things as electricity and telephone might be 
viewed as distributive, at least for those customers who cannot even pay 
the incremental (variable) costs of their service.262
Today, it seems safe to say, concerns about distribution have 
dramatically re-entered the picture, although the concerns tend to focus 
on productivity rather than on Robbins’s states of mind.263
VII. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The fundamental idea of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is as old as 
Anglo-American thought’s first marginalists. In the late eighteenth 
century Jeremy Bentham proposed his “principle of utility,” which would 
evaluate government policy by querying whether its “tendency . . . to 
augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to 
diminish it.”264 To be sure, this was not a modern theory of CBA. 
Utilitarianism would not make the jump from political philosophy to 
                                                                                                                     
260. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation 
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261. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 112–14.
262. On the development of the concept, see generally Herbert S. Dordick, The Origins of 
Universal Service: History as a Determinant of Telecommunications Policy, 14 TELECOMM.
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264. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
3 (1781) (“An action then may be said to be conformable to the principle of utility . . . when the 
tendency it has to augment the happiness of the community is greater than any it has to diminish 
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market economics for another century.265 Bentham was speaking of 
utility as a fairly abstract conception of “happiness,” or pain and pleasure, 
not as a tradeable standard of market exchange.
Bentham’s American contemporary, Benjamin Franklin, was also an 
important precursor. In a 1772 letter to Joseph Priestley which Franklin 
titled “Moral Algebra, or Method of Deciding doubtful Matters with 
oneself,” he offered this calculus of decision making:
[M]y way is, to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two 
columns: writing over the one pro, and over the other con:
then during three or four days consideration, I put down 
under the different heads, short hints of the different motives 
that at different time occur to me, for or against the measure. 
When I have thus got them altogether in one view, I 
endeavor to estimate their respective weights, and where I 
find two, (one on each side) that seem equal, I strike them 
both out. If I find a reason pro equal to some two reasons 
con, equal to some three reasons pro, I strike out the five; 
and thus proceeding, I find at length where the balance lies; 
and if after a day or two of further consideration, nothing 
new that is of importance occurs on either side, I come to a 
determination accordingly.266
The context suggests that Franklin was thinking not so much about 
social economic welfare as about personal decision making,267 but the 
methodology was similar nonetheless. Franklin also considered that 
under his methodology “the weight of reasons cannot be taken with the 
precision of algebraic quantities,” if nevertheless made him “less liable 
to make a rash step.”268
The modern theory of CBA grew more directly out of the early 
neoclassical debate over wealth distribution and interpersonal utility 
comparisons. In the wake of the Lionel Robbins’s critique noted above,269
Robbins’ younger colleague Nicholas Kaldor, and a little later John 
Hicks, proposed variations on the Pareto principle for assessing welfare 
without making interpersonal comparisons of utility or (in their view) 
                                                                                                                     
265. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 28–29.
266. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772), in I THE PRIVATE 
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other judgments about fairness.270 What became the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion of welfare was that a change is welfare superior if the marginal 
gains experienced by gainers are large enough that the gainers could 
compensate the marginal losers entirely out of their gains, thus leaving 
them indifferent.271 Actual compensation is not required. This more-or-
less became the question that CBA was designed to answer. No idea in 
the theory of regulation is more closely tied to marginalism than CBA,
which queries whether the marginal social benefits of any proposed 
change in a rule or practice are greater or less than the marginal social 
costs.272 The development of CBA was thus closely aligned with the 
analysis of social welfare functions in neoclassical welfare economics.273
The history of CBA as applied to regulatory problems is far too vast 
to be described here.274 Briefly, however, at least since President 
Reagan’s 1981 Executive Order Number 12,291275 it has played a 
prominent role in both the creation and the legal analysis of economic 
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275. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (ordering that a regulation 
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see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012) 
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regulation.276 At the same time, it remains subject to very fundamental 
disputes about such things as whether neoclassical rational actor 
assumptions should control all of CBA, or whether more behavioral 
analysis or other frameworks that contemplate evaluations outside of 
neoclassical norms should be considered.277 Another dispute is whether 
willingness-to-accept estimates of consumer value should be used in 
addition to or instead of willingness-to-pay evaluations.278 Another is 
how finely tuned CBA must be when used in actual agency rule making, 
or indeed, whether costs should be considered at all when certain benefits 
are technologically feasible or a statute requires consideration only of 
technical feasibility.279 In addition are more technical issues pertaining to 
risk and discount rates, spillovers,280 and quantification of things that are 
not readily subject to observable market trades, such as human life or
dignity.281
VIII. ACTUARIAL CONCEPTIONS OF VALUE AND MANAGEMENT OF RISK
The marginalist revolution in economics led to two fundamental shifts 
in thinking about economic value. One was the relationship between 
schedules of demand and the various types of costs that determine output 
and price. This shift accounts for previously discussed issues of 
regulatory policy such as natural monopoly and cost-of-service 
ratemaking.282
The other shift was in forward rather than backward looking 
conceptions of value—a change that accounted for the development of 
modern cost-benefit analysis, which is largely focused on expected 
value.283 That shift brought much needed realism to the commercial and 
legal system, although its eventual impact reached much further. For 
example, the classical notion that the value of a corporation is determined 
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by the amount of historically contributed capital bore no useful 
relationship to the value of a firm in the eyes of prospective shareholders 
or creditors.284 The only date on which a firm could meaningfully be said 
to be worth its paid in value was the day it commenced operations. After 
that its value could go either up or down, and often in a relatively short 
period of time. Some firms that started out with little capital became 
enormous and extravagantly wealthy. Others, which were much better 
financed to begin with, soon went broke. It all depended on luck, 
managerial success, the market success of new products or services, and 
the comparative success or failures of rivals. As firms became more 
complex and took up a greater portion of the economy, the backward 
system of valuation led to a crisis in the law of corporate finance: legal 
valuation and economic valuation, including the determinants of stock 
prices, had virtually nothing to do with each other.285
While the marginalist theory of corporate valuation was a significant 
improvement, reflecting market realities, it enormously complicated 
decisions about valuation. Under classical corporate finance theory, a 
judge could determine whether stock was “watered”—i.e., whether its 
capital was overstated—by doing some arithmetic. Contributions of 
noncash property complicated the calculations, but even these were 
within the experience of a commercial judge accustomed to settling 
estates or determining lost profits. But basing the value of a firm on its 
market prospects was much more difficult, because it included risk and 
uncertainty about a large variety of factors.286 The value of a firm became 
a composite answer to questions about the future value of a firm’s 
products, the quality of its management, its capacity to manufacture, 
various anticipated headwinds in sources of supply and labor relations, 
the number and anticipated health of present and future rivals, the value 
and remaining life of intellectual property portfolios, the expected health 
of the economy overall, and expectations about the national or perhaps 
world physical and regulatory environment. Thus the modern 10-K and 
reports to shareholders.
In addition, actuarial conceptions of risk, which depend entirely on 
marginalist tools, facilitated significant changes in the theory of firm risk 
                                                                                                                     
284. See infra text accompanying notes 285–87.
285. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 159–62.
286. Under Frank Knight’s terminology a “risk” occurs when the occurrence of a future event 
is unknown but can be calculated as a probability, such as the future toss of dice. By contrast, 
“uncertainty” deals with the occurrence of future events whose probability cannot be calculated. 
See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 231–32 (1921); Milton Friedman & L.J. 
Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279 (1948).
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bearing as well as insurance theory and law.287 The common law itself 
began to adopt more actuarial, or risk driven, conceptions of legal duties 
that governed things such as long-term (relational) contracting and the 
implementation of negligence and products liability rules in tort.288
These developments began early in the history of marginalist thought 
and have had staggering implications for regulation. The science of risk 
management has essentially developed into economically sophisticated 
and technical private and public branches. Private risk management refers 
mainly to how firms make investment or management decisions in the 
presence of risk. In The Nature of the Firm (1937), Ronald Coase tied 
risk assessment into his theory of firm size and structure. For example, 
minimizing risk might be accomplished by contracting for supply from 
knowledgeable outsiders rather than attempting to make something for 
oneself.289 The public branch of risk management is devoted mainly to 
problems of externalities or spillovers where government intervention is 
thought necessary.290 These are most likely to occur when one person’s 
or firm’s activities cause harm to someone else that the market does not 
internalize.
The balance of this Article briefly examines two areas in which risk 
management has played an important role in the design of regulatory 
policy, but there are many, many others.
                                                                                                                     
287. See generally ALLAN H. WILLETT, ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE (1901) 
(discussing risk and insurance). The Casualty Actuarial Society was created in 1914 as a 
professional association of insurance actuaries. Then-Professor, later Justice, William O. Douglas 
became one of the first legal scholars to write about the administration of risk. See, e.g., William 
O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584 (1929); William 
O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk II, 38 YALE L.J. 720 (1929).
288. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 123–55.
289. See Coase, supra note 13, at 398–401, much of which is taken from KNIGHT, supra note
286. See also Coase, supra note 13 (theorizing that the attitude toward risk may explain preference 
between short and long term contracting). On private risk management and tort exposure, see 
Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959)
290. On management of public risks, see generally 1 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON 
RISK ASSESSMENT & RISK MGMT., FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK 
MANAGEMENT (1997), http://oaspub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=36372
[https://perma.cc/7LG4-3PP9]. The Federal Aviation Administration, which is in the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, also maintains a handbook that describes the development and 
implementation of safety risk management processes. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SYSTEM 
SAFETY HANDBOOK (2000), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/
aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/ [https://perma.cc/WQ63-JAEE]. On private, or 
entrepreneurial risk management, see generally JAMES LAM, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT:
FROM INCENTIVES TO CONTROLS (2d ed. 2014) and ROBERT JARROW, THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
OF RISK MANAGEMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND APPLICATIONS (2016).
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A. Holmes’s Marginalism: Torts as Risk Management
The first marginalist legal scholar in the United States was Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., who devoted much of his academic writing to risk 
management, particularly within the common law legal system. Much has 
been written about the influence of Darwin on Holmes’s thought, but 
much less about Holmes’s marginalism, the other Victorian science that 
certainly had a more significant impact on his thinking.291 This was 
already reflected in Holmes’s lectures published as The Common Law
(1881).292 In his chapter on tort law he wrote that “the safest way to secure 
care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall 
be taken.”293 Further, the risk must generally be assigned to the person in 
control of outcomes.294 He also defended aggressive rules for highly 
dangerous conduct that “throw the risk upon the party pursuing it.”295 In 
contract law he argued that contracts should be viewed as “the taking of a 
risk” and a set of bets about the future. Consequential damages were not 
appropriate “unless the assumption of that risk is to be taken as having fairly 
entered into the contract.”296 While Holmes was not an economically 
technical marginalist, many of these ideas eventually worked their way into 
the law and economics movement.
Relatedly, Holmes’s external standard became a way of conforming 
individual activity to social norms so as to minimize risk. The legal system 
cannot assess states of mind; it can only control behavior.297 For that, 
Holmes posited the “average” person in “temperament, intellect and 
education”298 as the common law norm. Conduct that fell below that norm 
could rightfully be condemned as negligent. For example, “when the 
                                                                                                                     
291. On Holmes’s marginalism, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 38–41.
292. See generally O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881) (showing the influence of 
marginalism on Holmes).
293. Id. at 117. 
294. Id. at 149. 
295. Id.
296. Id. at 300–05.
297. E.g., id. at 49 (noting that even criminal law is indifferent to states of mind; rather its 
purpose is “to induce external conformity to rule”); id. at 62–63 (“The charge of malice 
aforethought in an indictment for murder has been shown not to mean a state of the defendant’s 
mind, as is often thought, except in the sense that he knew circumstances which did in fact make 
his conduct dangerous.”); id. at 136 (“‘[R]ecklessly’ . . . does not mean actual personal 
indifference to the truth . . . . [Rather,] [i]t means only that the data for the statement were so far 
insufficient that a prudent man could not have made it without leading to the inference that he was 
indifferent. . . . [I]f a man makes his statement on those data, he is liable, whatever was the state
of his mind . . . .”). On culpability, see id. at 146. “Foresight is a possible common denominator 
of wrongs at the two extremes of malice and negligence.” Id. On murder, see id. at 53–54. If an 
act is of such a nature that it would likely cause death “the law will not inquire whether he [i.e., 
the accused] did actually foresee the consequences or not.” Id.
298. Id. at 108.
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question of the defendant’s negligence is left to a jury, negligence does 
not mean the actual state of the defendant’s mind, but a failure to act as a 
prudent man of average intelligence would have done.”299
What Holmes did not fully articulate is that he was turning the “private” 
common law into a social control device. Holmes worked out the skeleton 
of a system in which deterrence at the margin became the goal of judge 
made legal policy, with his hypothetical “average man” as the determinant 
of the standard. Further, it was forward looking. Holmes repeatedly 
emphasized that the operative characteristic of his average person was 
reasonable foresight. “[I]f the intervening events are of such a kind that no 
foresight could have been expected to look out for them, the defendant is 
not to blame for having failed to do so,” Holmes wrote about proximate 
cause in tort law.300
Judge Learned Hand’s objective cost-benefit test for negligence was 
built entirely on these ideas, adding quantification to foresight.301 That 
test—that an action is negligent if the marginal cost of the untaken 
precaution would have been less than the marginal cost of the accident it 
would have prevented (probability ×magnitude)—represented the triumph 
of pure marginalism in tort law.302 As one pair of authors articulate the test:
“The marginal Hand rule states that the injurer is negligent if the marginal 
cost of his or her precaution is less than the resulting marginal benefit. 
Thus, the injurer is liable under the Hand rule when further precaution is 
cost-justified.”303
Today it has become conventional to regard the United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co.304 test for negligence as requiring a comparison of 
the marginal cost of precautions against the anticipated social cost of an 
accident. At the margin, an efficient actor who internalizes all these costs 
                                                                                                                     
299. Id. at 112. On criminal law, see id. at 54. “The test of foresight is not what this very 
criminal foresaw, but what a man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen.” Id.
300. Id. at 92; see also id. at 147 (“Negligence is not foresight, but precisely the want of it; 
and if foresight were presumed, the ground of the presumption, and therefore the essential 
element, would be the knowledge of facts which made foresight possible.”); id. at 130–31 
(necessity to show foresight in order to establish criminal intent); id. at 57 (“A harmful act is only 
excused on the ground that the party neither did foresee, nor could with proper care have foreseen 
harm.”). See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 123–43 (tracing the development of tort law 
and the doctrine of proximate cause); Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 
AM. L. REV. 201 (1870) (discussing the definition and application of proximate cause).
301. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), which was 
largely adopted by Guido Calabresi in THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 24–26 (1970), although couched in an argument that favored strict liability.
302. On the commonly accepted view that the relevant costs are marginal, see WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 87 (1987).
303. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 214–15 (6th ed. 2012).
304. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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will equate the two.305 That approach has also been substantially written 
into the test for dangerous and defective products given in the 
Restatement (Third) of Products Liability that “[a] product . . . is defective 
in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative 
design.”306 That approach creates a preference for negligence as a product 
design rule, although the Restatement (Third) retains a strict liability rule 
for manufacturing defects, where the costs of establishing negligence are 
much higher.307
This approach effectively turns product liability tort law into an 
exercise in risk management and cost-benefit analysis. As a common law 
rule, of course, it does not “regulate” in the command and control sense,
but generally imposes liability after the fact. However, federal agencies 
such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) operate under 
the same standard for product safety requirements that are imposed ex 
ante.308 The more salient fact is that this rule, much like the risk-utility 
test used in tort cases, incorporates regulatory principles into the common 
law, using formulations that compare the marginal cost of precautions 
against marginal benefits. In the words of one scholar of products 
liability, that is “the level at which the marginal cost of the investment 
equals the marginal cost of product-related accidents thereby 
avoided.”309
B. Innovation Risk and PTAB Patent Review
Innovation often requires firms to take on a great deal of cost, risk, 
and uncertainty in contemplation of significant reward. A well designed 
patent system should manage these risks and rewards effectively. The 
                                                                                                                     
305. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 147; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 302; Robert 
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7, 7 
n.7 (1985); Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v. Carrol
Towing Co. Reconsidered, 7 AM. L. ECON. REV. 523, 524 (2005).
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see also
Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product 
Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2009).
307. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(a).
308. See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(f)(2) (2012) (prohibiting the CPSC from promulgating a product 
safety rule “unless it has prepared . . . a final regulatory analysis of the rule containing . . . [a] 
description of the potential benefits and potential costs of the rule”); see also Zen Magnets, LLC 
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 841 F.3d 1141, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (disapproving a CPSC 
rule where cost-benefit analysis was unsupported); cf. United States v. Atl. Richfield Co., 429 F. 
Supp. 830, 832–33, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (interpreting 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. 1976), a federal
standard for determining liability for oil spills, as creating a marginal Carroll Towing test).
309. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment 
of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 765 (1983).
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consensus is strong that a patent system is necessary to facilitate 
innovation,310 and of course the Constitution expressly authorizes its 
creation.311 The appropriate question is not whether to regulate, but rather 
how to regulate. If the marginal exclusion created by the patent system is 
too small, too little will be invested in innovation. On the other hand, if 
the patent system over-excludes, it acts as a clog on the flow of 
technology. The trick is to find the sweet spot between excessive and 
inadequate protection.312
Considered in isolation, the initial system under which patent 
applications are evaluated and granted suggests significant deficiencies. 
First, it is largely ex parte, which means that the examiner hears almost 
exclusively from proponents of the patent.313 Second, patent examiners 
do not have the time or resources to give each patent application adequate
consideration. On average a patent receives 19 or fewer hours of 
examination.314 The average number of claims in a patent hovers at 
around 16–18,315 which suggests that examiners spend about an hour per 
claim evaluating patents, disregarding the time they need to spend on 
other portions of the patent application. As a result, too many invalid 
patents are granted. When patent validity is litigated in an adversarial 
setting, where considerably more resources are put into the analysis, as 
                                                                                                                     
310. Strong, but not unanimous. For one of the exceptions, see generally MICHELE BOLDRIN
& DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) (arguing that patent and 
copyright be largely abolished).
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
312. See generally CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 16–59 (2012) (discussing the costs 
and benefits associated with patent systems).
313. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An 
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2011) (linking ex parte nature of patent 
prosecution to need for an inequitable conduct defense).
314. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States 
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 135 (2002); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is
the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? 
Evidence from Microlevel Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550 app. at 2 tbl.A1 (2017);
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2001);
see also Roger Allan Ford, The Patent Spiral, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 838 (2016); Janet Freilich, 
Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925, 964 (2018) (“Examiners have a small amount of time 
allocated to examining each patent—an average of 18 hours per patent.”); John R. Thomas, 
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (“[T]he average time allocated for an examiner to address one application 
is understood to be between sixteen and seventeen hours.”); Brenda Sandburg, Speed Over 
Substance?, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Mar. 1999.
315. For recent data, see Dennis Crouch, Standard Patent Size, PATENTLYO (Oct. 22, 2017), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/10/standard-patent-size.html [https://perma.cc/9VPH-NSFR].
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many as 60% or even more of these already issued patents are found 
completely or partially invalid.316
Invalidity rates are only part of the problem of patent quality, 
however. In addition, a very large number of legally valid patents have 
no economic value. They may be perfectly valid as a matter of patent law, 
but they are worthless because there is no market for the idea that they 
offer. The technologies they invent may be too costly in relation to what 
they provide. There may be better methods for doing the same thing. They 
may be solutions in search of a problem. In any event, more than 90% of 
issued patents are never licensed, and of these a high percentage are never 
commercialized at all.317 Only 1–3% of issued patents are ever litigated, 
and the rate has been declining, which is consistent with the proposition 
that the commercial value of issued patents (aside from validity 
questions) is declining as well.318 Further, patent litigation is very 
expensive, ranging from $600k where less than $1m is at risk, to 
approximately $5m when the amount at risk exceeds $25m.319
While patent examiners are trained to consider questions of legal 
validity, they do not generally consider commercial value or success, 
except in obvious cases of patents that do not work, claim physically 
                                                                                                                     
316. See Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating 
Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (2012) (looking at Federal Circuit 
decisions, 59.8% found invalid). Another study largely in accord is John R. Allison et al.,
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1777–79 (2014). 
That study updates John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 188–93 (1998). See also Paul M. Janicke & Lilan Ren, 
Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 16, 17, 19, 30 (2006) (breaking down 
data by technology, identity of inventors, and accused infringers and law firms); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10 (2016) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has made it easier to invalidate patents). 
317. See Daniel Fisher, The Real Patent Crisis is Stifling Innovation, FORBES (June 18, 
2014, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/06/18/13633/#75d2ca2e6f1c 
[https://perma.cc/98AG-8EGR]. For a more detailed breakdown of the data, see generally
RON D. KATZNELSON, A CENTURY OF PATENT LITIGATION IN PERSPECTIVE (2014), 
http://www.ipleadership.org/articles/century-patent-litigation-perspective [https://perma.cc/
PM4T-TFJ4].
318. See KATZNELSON, supra note 317, at 11 fig.3; PWC, 2017 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY:
CHANGE ON THE HORIZON? 4 fig.1 (2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/05/2017-Patent-Litigation-Study_PwC.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF3E-WGUG] (showing the 
decline in patent litigation case filings); see also Hannibal Travis, Counter-IP Conspiracies: 
Patent Alienability and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 758, 768 (2017) 
(discussing the decline in patent value).
319. See Samson Vermont, AIPLA Survey of Costs of Patent Litigation and Inter Partes 
Review, PATENTATTORNEY.COM (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.patentattorney.com/aipla-survey-
of-costs-of-patent-litigation-and-inter-partes-review/ [https://perma.cc/3695-F6JF].
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impossible things,320 or are useless on their face.321 One can only imagine, 
but requiring examiners to test unissued patents for commercial value 
would increase examination costs enormously, even assuming they were 
capable of doing it. The best way to test commercial, as opposed to legal, 
value is through the market. A legally valid patent is commercially 
valuable if at least one firm wants to license it or produce technology or 
processes that infringe it.
A rational system for optimizing patent issuance must be responsive 
to concerns about both invalidity and economic value. Further, it must 
make these evaluations at reasonable cost. The patent examining process 
assesses legal validity, but economic value is best assessed by the relevant 
parties’ willingness to put resources into validity determinations. If a 
patent is economically worthless it is unlikely that people will object to 
it or dispute its validity, because it does not interfere with their business.
In its 2018 Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy 
Group, LLC322 decision the Supreme Court approved a sensible 
regulatory approach to the system that assesses the legal validity of 
patents prior to litigation.323 The challenged administrative process, 
called inter partes review,324 permits any person to ask the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to reconsider and, if necessary, 
cancel one or more claims in an issued patent.325 The procedure is 
administrative but adversarial. Both the patentee and the challenger have 
participation rights, including the right to present evidence, make 
arguments, and have a hearing before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(PTAB).326 This makes the process significantly different and more 
demanding than the type of ex parte examination that goes on during 
initial patent prosecution. However, it is also much less costly than patent 
infringement litigation in a federal district court. Most particularly, PTAB 
review is limited to questions of validity under §§ 102 and 103 of the 
                                                                                                                     
320. See Daniel C. Rislove, A Case Study of Inoperable Inventions: Why Is the USPTO 
Patenting Pseudoscience?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1302, 1304 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, 
patents on perpetual motion or cold fusion machines, which are routinely rejected). For perpetual 
motion applications the USPTO does not reject them out of hand, but requires a working model. 
See MPEP § 608.03 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015).
321. For good perspective, see Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1195, 1197 (2010) and Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1047 
(2014).
322. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
323. Id. at 1369.
324. Created in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). See Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371.
325. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19.   
326. The process is briefly laid out in Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371–72.
57
Hovenkamp: Regulation and the Marginalist Revolution
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
512 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
Patent Act; it does not consider infringement.327 The PTAB decision is 
fully reviewable on appeal to the Federal Circuit in which both the 
patentee and the challenger are entitled to appear, as well as PTAB 
itself.328
The PTAB proceeding permits the Agency to do a much more 
thorough and yet relatively low cost review of patent validity.329 The 
costs of administrative inter partes review are dramatically lower than 
the cost of litigation, running around $275k through a PTAB hearing and 
$350k through appeal.330 One Amicus in Oil States estimated the cost 
differential between litigation and inter partes review as exceeding ten to 
one.331 Importantly, however, the costs are not zero, and as a result 
someone must have a financial incentive to challenge a patent. Most 
likely, this is someone producing technology that arguably infringes the 
patent in question, assuming it is valid. That is to say, patents that are 
challenged in a PTAB inter partes proceeding very likely do have 
positive commercial value, assuming they are valid, or no one would 
bother to challenge them.
Some critics of this administrative inter partes review system lament 
that it undermines a “strong patent system.”332 That is an odd use of 
terminology, in which “strong patent system” becomes a synonym for 
protection of weak patents. It is as if a military general who, upon being 
instructed to raise a strong army, responded by abolishing or 
downgrading requirements for physical and mental fitness. That might 
produce a lot of soldiers, but not likely a stronger army. You don’t protect 
a strong patent system by approving lots of weak patents, but rather by 
coming up with a rational, cost-effective system for distinguishing those 
                                                                                                                     
327. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
328. See id. § 319; Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371–72 (describing the appeals procedure).
329. Accord Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution, 8 INNOVATION 
POL’Y & ECON. 111, 136–37 (2007); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong are 
Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347, 1347 (2008) (arguing that it would be efficient to create 
a process that determines patent validity prior to licensing).
330. See Vermont, supra note 319.
331. Brief for Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Oil States, 138
S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712).
332. E.g., Brief of Univ. of N.M. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, 16, Oil 
States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712) (equating elimination of inter partes review with protection 
of a “strong patent system”); James Carmichael & Brad Close, Despite Oil States, Inter Partes 
Review May Still be Held Unconstitutional, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/04/25/despite-oil-states-inter-partes-review-may-still-
be-held-unconstitutional/id=96406/ [https://perma.cc/PD36-4CAT]; Gene Quinn, Predicting Oil 
States in Advance of SCOTUS Oral Arguments, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 12, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/12/predicting-oil-states-advance-scotus-oral-arguments/id 
=89661/ [https://perma.cc/KN86-WXTK] (identifying abolition of inter partes review as 
protecting a “strong patent system”).
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patents that make the requisite contribution to technological progress 
from those that do not.
The two-stage patent evaluation system that inter partes review 
permits is an efficient application of the economics of information, 
although there is some potential for abuse. 333 In George Stigler’s words, 
“the optimum amount of search will be such that the marginal cost of 
search equals the expected increase in receipts.”334 At the initial grant 
stage relatively few resources are committed to establishing validity—a
rational decision, given that so many patents are commercially worthless 
even if they are valid. While the error rate is high, the likelihood that 
anyone will be harmed is relatively low. Once their commercial value has 
been declared via a PTAB validity challenge, however, the stakes have 
gone up and a more costly examination is called for. One additional likely 
effect is that in the residual patent infringement cases in the district courts 
a relatively higher percentage of resources will go to questions of 
infringement, including claim construction and damages, rather than 
validity. Questions of infringement typically do not second guess the 
patent issuance process.335 Rather, they accept the patentee’s claims as 
given and consider the scope of the accused device or process.
The patent system, including inter partes review before PTAB, is 
intended to manage both the very considerable social risk and cost 
attending innovation as well as its private costs. As with so many 
marginalist institutions, its job is to thread the needle between a policy 
that properly incentivizes useful and worthwhile technology while 
leaving the channels open for other development. An overly aggressive 
patent system is bad for the dissemination of technological progress just 
as much as an underdeterrent one.
CONCLUSION
In our current era in which agency review is under attack, it is worth 
considering exactly what we would have to do to roll the clock back. 
While this Article does not prove the point, it does suggest that returning 
                                                                                                                     
333. One troublesome example is PTAB challenges intended to do nothing more than reduce 
the value of the firm that owns the patent, thus making short-selling of that firm’s stock a 
profitable activity. See Feng Ye, Trading on the Outcomes of Patent Challenges: Short-Selling 
Petitioners and Possible Modifications to the Inter Partes Review Process, 98 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 557, 561 (2016). An empirical study supporting the strategy is Rabea 
Kruppert, Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock: Empirical Analysis of a New Hedge Fund Strategy,
50 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 25, 31–34 (2017). Another problematic practice is the equivalent of 
“pay for delay” settlements of PTAB proceedings. See Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed 
Entry Settlements at the Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30, 30 (2018). 
334. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 216 (1961).
335. One exception is Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 
(2002) and its progeny, which govern the narrowing of claims during the patent prosecution 
process.
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to a world in which generalist judges are responsible for devising and 
executing regulatory policy will require nothing less than reversing the 
marginalist revolution itself.
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